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 Whether the hero be ridiculous or sublime, Greek or barbarian, gentile or Jew,  
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Isaiah Berlin’s conception of pluralism is often confused with relativism. The purpose of 
this thesis is to assess the solidity of his arguments concerning the distinction between 
the two theories against the backdrop of two interpretations by two very different 
thinkers that similarly approximate pluralism to relativism: John Gray, the radical 
pluralist, and Leo Strauss, the steward of naturalism.  
 
Berlin tendered a conception of pluralism whereby the inevitable conflict among values 
proves they are equally valid, equally absolute and sometimes incommensurable, thus 
rendering the inevitability of choice a fundamental element of the human condition. This 
theory emerges as an alternative to monism, but its distinction from relativism merits 
special consideration given that both theories are often regarded as similar.  
 
Despite acknowledging variety within ethics, Berlin argues the theories remain distinct 
for two reasons: first, pluralism allows for the possibility of judging moral choices as 
right or wrong beyond their respective contexts whereas relativism does not; and second, 
pluralism, unlike relativism, asserts values are objective because they are universal. Each 
of these two arguments shall be assessed from two angles respectively: the first analysis 
will address the capability for moral choice considering the incommensurability factor 
and the role context plays in decision making; whereas the second shall look at the claim 
that values are universal from the point of view of its implications and the theory’s 
foundations. In conclusion, Berlin’s arguments appear to stand the test.  
 
Word Count Dissertation (excluding footnotes): 25.101  
Word Count Dissertation (including footnotes): 29.893  
Word Count Abstract: 235 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE LESSON OF A “HEDGEFOX” 
 
Isaiah Berlin experienced life as one man seeing through many spectacles. Personally 
influenced by three cultural strands, Russian, British and Jewish,1 amidst what can 
perhaps be called the most stormy century in terms of ideology, the 20th century, his 
inquisitive mind led him to explore the history of the ideas he witnessed unfold 
throughout his lifetime. This journey unveiled one of his most notable claims about 
morality: Pluralism. Choice is, for this theory, a central property of human life, evincing a 
plurality of equally legitimate and universal moral ends. The admission of diversity often 
causes pluralism to be misconstrued as another theory: Relativism. This view grounds the 
validity of multiple moral outlooks in the contexts from which they emerge. It is the 
purpose of this thesis to assess whether Berlin succeeds in defending pluralism against 
confusions with this other theory. 
 
The defining element of pluralism is truly the inevitability of conflict and its inherent 
necessity for choice among equally ultimate ends. The theory does not, to be sure, merely 
state that there are different manifestations of the same universal values.2 It goes deeper, 
claiming there are many different legitimate combinations of values. This is why the 
theory has come to be known as “value-pluralism,” even though Berlin never employed 
the term. Correspondingly, this version of pluralism will be confronted with what the 
author qualified as the relativism “of judgement of values.”3  
 
Pluralism first emerges out of the rebuttal, not of relativism, but of monism – the long 
                                                
1 Berlin, Personal Impressions, 433-9.  
2 As notes George Crowder, “value-pluralism is not mere ‘plurality of belief,’ the idea that different people or different groups of 
people believe different things.” (Crowder, Liberalism & Value Pluralism, 3.) 
3 In one of Berlin’s most straightforward efforts of distinguishing pluralism from relativism he writes: “There are two types of 
relativism, that of judgments of fact, and that of judgements of values. The first, in its strongest form, denies the very possibility of 
objective knowledge of facts, since all belief is conditioned by the place in the social system . . . It is, however, only the second type of 
relativism, that of values or entire outlooks, that is in question here.” (Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 77.) 
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held assumption that there can only be one holistic answer to moral queries. Indeed, as 
an interpreter of the many ideological currents that have shaped Western political and 
philosophical discourse, namely since the Enlightenment to the twentieth century, Berlin 
found that most were reluctant to accept what was an all-pervading conviction in his 
thought:  
 
The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with 
choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of 
some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.4  
 
Berlin famously epitomised the pluralist and monist outlooks in an essay inspired by an 
ancient line “‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.’”5 Yet, 
a more accurate way to portray pluralism, and Berlin himself for that matter, would be 
“the fox knows many things because, like the hedgehog, it knows one big thing: choice is 
inevitable.” Michael Ignatieff believed Berlin “was a fox who longed to be a hedgehog”6 
while Steven Lukes depicted him as an “old-fashioned fox.”7 George Crowder, on the 
other hand, claimed Berlin was “a hedgehog whose single underlying message is, 
ironically, that of value pluralism.”8 Unlike these critics, the argument, which will here be 
presented, rather entails a combination of the two archetypes. Pluralism is the outlook of 
a “hedgefox.” Berlin is many things, an “empiricist, realist, objectivist, anti-rationalist, 
anti-relativist,”9 not to mention a pluralist and a liberal, because he knows one big thing: 
choice is “a permanent characteristic of the human predicament.”10 
 
Isaiah Berlin was a hedgefox not just in outlook but in style as well. Instead of 
                                                
4 Berlin, Liberty, 213-4. 
5 This line, attributed to the Greek poet Archilochus, inspires Berlin's famous essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox.” (Berlin, The Proper 
Study of Mankind, 437-498.)  
6 Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin, 203. 
7 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, 114. 
8 Crowder, Isaiah Berlin, 5. 
9 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, 114. 
10 Berlin, Liberty, 43. 
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consistently presenting his views in a systematic theory, he left an extensive body of 
essays in which his ideas come across through his appraisals of many influential thinkers. 
Because of this, his views are frequently regarded as inconsistent, scattered or even 
“characteristically compressed and allusive.”11 Curiously, however, the very fact that the 
author ends up demonstrating the same convictions throughout a lifetime of writings 
without setting out to do so, actually reinforces how coherent his central beliefs were. 
Henry Hardy, who has laboriously assembled and compiled Berlin’s scattered works, has 
come to be persuaded of this: “I do indeed believe that Berlin has a clear underlying 
vision that is not always expressed as lucidly and consistently as it might be.”12 Hence, 
the present work will attempt to tease out from Berlin’s variegated remarks his central 
view of pluralism, and why he was so sure it was not relativism.  
 
Berlin’s overall view of pluralism will be extracted from the many avenues of thought he 
explored in his journey throughout the history of ideas. The first chapter, “From the 
One to the Many,” will therefore begin with his denial of monism and his views on the 
social sciences methodological debate, passing through the ideas he imported from the 
Counter-Enlightenment, finally ending with his defence against relativism. The second 
chapter, “Two Critics of Isaiah Berlin,” will look into two of the most notable 
interpretations of Berlin’s work, by two very different thinkers: John Gray, the radical 
pluralist, and Leo Strauss, the devout monist. Despite their differences, it will be 
demonstrated how these two critics are inadvertently aligned in deriving relativist 
consequences from Berlin’s position. In the third chapter, “Pluralism v. Relativism,” the 
main problems detected in Berlin’s proposal which lead to a confusion with relativism, 
will be put under a thorough trial at the end of which its sustenance will be proved. 
                                                
11 Nussbaum, “Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” 3. 
12 Henry Hardy goes on to say  “one can tease it out from his scattered remarks, rejecting confused statements and refining unfocused 
ones. . . . The more one reads, the more obvious it becomes that the central ideas are clear and strong. If he nevertheless doesn't 
always state them as well as he might, this may be because it wasn't a project for him to do so: rather they emerge incidentally from 
discussions of other issues. (In an email conversation with Henry Hardy on May 26th, 2015.) 
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Finally, in the last chapter entitled “Untidy Universe,” an overall view of pluralism shall 
be recounted in order to ground some very pertinent considerations about the challenge 
faced by contemporary political theory. 
 
The world Berlin experienced was evidence of what the clash of different moralities can 
lead to when they are blinded an all-pervading ancient fallacy in Western philosophy: 
“the search for a single, overarching ideal because it is the one and only true one for 
humanity, invariably leads to coercion,”13 he vehemently asserted. Because of this view, 
Isaiah Berlin is often associated with “Cold War liberalism” alongside thinkers such as 
Raymond Aron and Karl Popper. 14  In fact, according to his biographer, Michael 
Ignatieff, Berlin’s most original claim was not pluralism, but the connection between 
pluralism and liberalism. Regardless of its originality, this statement is certainly the most 
problematic for Berlin. As shall later be demonstrated, this is the view that dominantly 
earns Berlin the charge of inconsistency, for those positions are often construed as 
mutually exclusive instead of mutually entailing. In any case, this discussion cannot be 
fully addressed here, even though this study will inevitably lead to a clear stand about it: 
such views misinterpret, and actually blatantly disregard, Berlin’s arguments according to 
which there is no discrepancy among the two positions. 
 
The utter cruelty that monist ideologies spread throughout the twentieth century led to 
the recognition of the need for a morally tolerant society. Tolerance, as a means to an 
“uneasy equilibrium”15 has since become the archetypal feature of liberalism, for today a 
liberal society has become practically synonymous with a plural society. Yet, as Timothy 
Garton Ash observed, Isaiah Berlin’s conception of pluralism is even more relevant in 
                                                
13 Berlin, “A Message to the 21st Century,” The New York Review of Books, October, 23, 2014, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/23/message-21st-century/. 
14 Müller, “Fear and Freedom,” 46. 
15 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 20. 
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this day and age than it was in the time that led him to conceive it.16 In today’s 
overpopulated and interconnected world, deeply entrenched cultural backgrounds, 
religious views and different ways of life converge in the so called open society the West 
prides itself in promoting. Not only do these conceptions inevitably clash among 
themselves but, in a growing number of cases, they contest the very values that sustain 
the state that strives to accommodate them.  
 
“[P]olitical philosophy,” argued Berlin, “is but ethics applied to society.”17 Pluralism, 
therefore, entails deep practical implications for the times we now live in, since the 
challenge of allowing for a plural society to prevail within a political framework has never 
been so arduous. Whether this philosophical postulation holds its ground against 













                                                
16 The scholar observed that in the Europe of today, “the problems we face, the challenges, are particularly to do with the living 
together, the friction, the rubbing off against each other of people with very different backgrounds, traditions, religions, languages, 
nationalities, some would say cultures.” (Garton Ash, “Isaiah Berlin and the Challenge of Multiculturalism,” The Isaiah Berlin Lecture, 
lesson n.2, 36m podcast, July 3rd, 2008, iTunesU - Oxford University, starting at minute 10.) 
17 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 2. 
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CHAPTER I 
FROM THE ONE TO THE MANY 
Isaiah Berlin’s conception of pluralism was gradually uncovered and refined throughout 
his long life of inquiry, rather than systematically theorised. Quite consistently with his 
nature,18 instead of a coherent proposal, it is as if all of his work is a collection of 
evidence that demonstrates pluralism accords with the reality of the human moral 
experience. The purpose of this chapter is to uncover the many elements that sustain this 
unwavering conviction of Berlin’s.  
 
The author’s view of pluralism will be contextualised within the many threads of his 
thinking.  Pluralism is, for Berlin, the opposite of monism, and he usually explains the 
first in contrast with the latter. Therefore, the ensuing subchapter, “The Perennial 
Fallacy,” will begin with the author’s refutation of monism, followed by his views on the 
social sciences’ methodological debate. Berlin’s positions on both the human moral 
makeup and its appropriate methodological approach combine Enlightenment and 
Counter-Enlightenment ideas. In “The Realm of Ethics” his appreciation of romanticism 
and of other critics of the Enlightenment will be expounded. Delving into the “history of 
ideas,” Giambattista Vico and Johann Gottfried von Herder were Berlin’s main source of 
inspiration concerning pluralism. Because they are regularly portrayed as relativists, one 
of Berlin’s most committed dissertations on the difference between pluralism and 
relativism is built upon those author’s contributions. These arguments shall be the focus 
of the last part of this chapter, entitled “Windowed Boxes.” 
 
                                                
18 According to Steven Lukes, Joseph Brodsky wrote “In the realm I was from . . . ‘philosophy’ was a by and large a foul word and 
entailed the notion of a system. What was good about Four Essays on Liberty was that it advanced none, since ‘liberty’ and ‘system’ are 
antonyms.” (Cit. Lukes, “The Singular and the Plural,” 81.) Lukes finds this statement an exaggeration, citing several liberal thinkers 
who have exhibited “the esprit du système that Berlin so notably lacks,” although he readily acknowledges that Berlin’s views “are, it is 
true, inimical to such system-building and his favourite liberal heroes – Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Alexander Herzen 
– are none of them builders of systems.” (Lukes, “The Singular and the Plural,” 81.) 
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1.1. THE PERENNIAL FALLACY 
1.1.1. The Ideal 
 
“If men never disagreed about the ends of life . . .”19 These words open Isaiah Berlin’s 
arguably most notorious essay: “Two Concepts of Liberty.” This disagreement, which 
permeates all dimensions of human existence, spanning from the innermost human 
world to the relations both between men and groups of men, embodies an often 
disconcerting fact of human life: choice among conflicting and equally valid ends, with 
the inherent sacrifice of all but the one designated, is inevitable. This uncomfortable 
truth has fostered a lasting desire to transcend it. Thus, most of Western Philosophy, 
from Ancient Greece to present times, rests on one “demonstrably false”20 assumption: 
there is only one right answer to each pestering question of mankind. In Berlin’s words, 
 
This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in 
the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in 
the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient 
faith rests on the conviction that all the positive values in which men have believed 
must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another.21 
 
In opposition to this “ancient faith,” monism, lies pluralism. Based, not on an 
understanding of what reality should be, but on “the world that we encounter in ordinary 
experience,”22 which reveals how misleading such a “pursuit of the ideal”23 actually is. 
Choice itself entails the notion of sacrificing something that is valuable. Otherwise, why 
would choice need be made at all? Human nature attributes value to several ends, some 
of which may collide or be at odds with each other, rendering the prospect of 
compatibility or of a harmonious order among them, no more than a “metaphysical 
                                                
19 Berlin, Liberty, 166. 
20 Ibid, 214. 
21 Ibid, 213. 
22 Ibid, 213-4. 
23 Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” 1-20.  
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chimera.” 24  Hence, “the necessity of choosing between absolute claims is,” Berlin 
famously claims, “an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”25 
 
In attempting to escape the agony of value loss, utopian grails truly aim at eliminating 
choice altogether. The problem is, for Isaiah Berlin, not just that these aspirations are “an 
attempt to pulverize society into the imaginary constituents of . . . false societies,”26 but 
that they inadvertently propound a dehumanizing effect. Choice is an integral component 
of human nature. Denying this “seems . . . to falsify the knowledge of men as free 
agents.”27 
 
The centrality of choice in Berlin’s overall work gives way to several ramifications. 
Among them, the most prominent28 and problematic is the claim that pluralism entails 
liberalism.29 This very intricate discussion falls outside the scope of this thesis but shall 
inevitably adjoin it where it is warranted for the appropriate understanding of the current 
analysis. The connection between choice and human nature, on the other hand, is of 
critical importance to this study, and shall be later addressed in detail. For now, the 
inevitability of choice stands as evidence for pluralism as true, which in turn is 
simultaneously demonstrated by, and a demonstration of, the falsity of monism. 
 
The validity of pluralism is simply sustained by empirical observation, rather than by 
some “remote, or incoherent, ideal,” which is the case with monism.30 True experience 
reveals “that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual 
                                                
24 Berlin, Liberty, 213. 
25 Ibid, 214. 
26 Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, 9. 
27 Berlin, Liberty, 216. 
28 In his account of Isaiah Berlin’s life, Michael Ignatieff considered the author had three core convictions: “in moral pluralism, liberal 
freedom and their mutual entailment.” (Ignatieff, Isaiah Berlin, 286.) 
29 Two clarifications on Liberalism and the notion of Liberty should be made. (1) For Isaiah Berlin, pluralism entails liberalism, but 
liberalism does not necessarily entail pluralism. His essay “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life” demonstrates how Mill’s liberalism 
is monistic. (Berlin, Liberty, 218-79.) (2) Berlin makes a distinction between “Liberty” in a political sense and in a basic sense: in the 
first sense, it is a value pursued as part of a society one wishes to live in; whereas in the second sense, “liberty” is equated with the 
capacity to choose, which, according to him, can never be eliminated. (Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 218.) 
30 Berlin, Liberty, 217. 
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rivalry with one another.”31 Everyday life exposes men to alternatives they must weigh 
against each other, regularly demanding the partial or entire sacrifice of something 
valued, and sometimes requiring impossible choices among equally cherished goods or 
equally dreaded evils. These latter cases convey, not just that values are not all compatible 
among themselves, but that when they conflict, there may be no standard to weigh them 
against – they are incommensurable.  
 
Monism, in whatever philosophical guise it appears, seeks coherence. A tidy world. This 
means that it seeks to transcend conflict, either by finding one, or a selection of 
overarching values, that will be known as preferable to other values; or by establishing a 
ranking of values; or by fixing a standard against which to measure all apparently 
conflicting values. What would a world where all human ideals were simultaneously 
realized look like? More importantly, what would life be like if no choice among 
alternatives were necessary? Would the notion of values even exist? How, without 
choice, would people mould their lives? Would there be purpose? A horizon to 
contemplate? And, how ideal would life be in a utopian world? Berlin would probably 
remark as he often did: “I don’t want the universe to be to tidy.”32 
 
One of the main tenets of Berlin’s contribution is the wariness against the application of 
abstractions upon reality. This is why he is generally thought of as a “Cold War liberal,”33 
for the ideologies of his time – Nationalism, Communism, Totalitarianism – brought 
oppression and led to the most terrible inhumane acts, practiced in light of a certain yet 
illusive ideal. Bearing witness to utopian constructions wreaking hell on Earth, Berlin saw 
himself gradually morph into a historian of ideas while searching for the underlying 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 125. 
33 The association between Isaiah Berlin and Cold-War Liberalism is largely accepted. Jan-Werner Müller writes specifically on Berlin 
as part of this stage of liberalism, which Judith Shklar named as “'liberalism of fear,” defining it as “a skeptical liberalism concerned 
primarily with avoiding the worst, rather than achieving the best.” (Cit. Müller, “Fear and Freedom,” 47-48). 
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notions that were embodied in such devastating creeds. What he found was, of course, 
the perennial assumption. Because there was only one answer, there could not be many, 
therefore all possible alternatives were necessarily wrong, which in case of conflict, 
meant they needed to be eradicated.  
 
But, as Berlin claims, monism has been present in Western philosophy since the cradle of 
its birth. So what vested these ideologies with such certainty that men fervently pursued 
them to their ultimate consequences during his lifetime? In one of the many instances 
the author discoursed on monism, the perennial fallacy, he explained that it lies on a 
“three legged-stool” made up of three core propositions: 
 
i. [T]o all genuine questions there can only be one correct answer, all the others 
answers being incorrect . . .  
ii. [A] method exists for the discovery of these correct answers. Whether any man 
knows or can, in fact, know it, is another question but it must, at least in principle, be 
knowable, provided that the right procedure for establishing it is used. 
iii. [A]nd perhaps the most important . . . follows from a simple, logical truth: that one 
truth cannot be incompatible with another truth; all correct answers embody or rest 
on truths; therefore none of the correct answers . . . can ever be in conflict with one 
another.34 
 
The first and last propositions pertain directly to what has been said so far: (i.) there is an 
assumption according to which each genuine question has one possible answer; (iii.) and 
the truth forms one perfect whole of which all single right answers are a compatible part. 
The second statement, however, answers an additional question: if there is a truth, how 
can it be found? Certainty of an answer arises from the certainty of the method 




                                                
34 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 25-26. (Numeration added.) 
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1.1.2. The Pursuit 
 
The Enlightenment earned its designation because it brought clarity to many of the 
tantalizing mysteries that long intrigued mankind. Reason unveiled many secrets of 
physics and mathematics, of the human body and biology, nature and the universe at 
large. It rid men of the obscurity of unquestioned beliefs, superstitions and of downright 
ignorance. Yet those who looked only to the light became blind to everything else. What 
they thought to have eradicated, they merely replaced: incontrovertible faith, not in God, 
but in Reason. The path to the correct answer to each of the many perennial mysteries 
was unearthed: the scientific method. 
 
The Enlightenment, then, brought an exalted approach to the pursuit of answers which, 
up until that point had been thought of as outside the human reach, whether because 
man was ill equipped to understand them or because they belonged to an outer realm he 
was not meant to access. The successive breakthroughs in the natural sciences spawned 
the conviction that similar advances, including in matters of morality, could be achieved 
in the humanities through the use of the scientific method as well. And so Berlin points 
out the convictions that result from monist assumptions when coupled with the rational 
method, when applied to political philosophy: 
 
i. All men have one true purpose, which is that of rational self-direction; 
ii. The ends of all rational beings must be combined in a universal and harmonious 
pattern which some men are more prepared to grasp than most;  
iii. All conflict is avoidable in the light of unobstructed and fully realized reason; 
iv. Once all men have become wholly rational beings they will follow the rational law 
that is one and the same for all and therefore achieve liberation.35 
 
Berlin makes this enumeration in an effort to demonstrate how the value of freedom, 
                                                
35 Berlin, Liberty, 21. 
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whether negative or positive,36 can be constructed in such a way that it becomes quite its 
opposite – liberation means freedom from choice, not freedom of choice.37 What is 
relevant in this example, for the purpose of this thesis, is that once again applying the 
rational method to morality results in an obliteration of alternative valid, and even 
rational ends. Human choice is nothing but an illusion. One further conclusion ensues: 
there is a gross assumption that the world the humanities study is the same as, and abides 
by the same laws which rule the physical world. 
 
While Berlin was committed to rational thinking, throughout his work he denounced the 
limits of reason, and the potentially destructive results it could lead to when employed as 
if such limits did not exist. In several instances, Berlin makes the argument that there is 
only a very small part of the knowable world that can be systematically understood. In 
“The Purpose of Philosophy,”38 he draws the distinction between questions that imply 
their own answer and those which leave man perplexed about how to answer them. All 
of philosophy is an attempt to shuffle the latter kind into the first kind, which is made of 
either “two baskets:”39 the empirical basket, consisting of the data of observation; and the 
formal basket, comprised of questions which depend on calculation upon fixed axioms and 
rules of deduction, like mathematics or grammar. Yet, the author considers even this 
distinction to be a “drastically over-simple formulation (because) formal and empirical 
elements are not so easily disentangled.”40 Even if they were, they would cover only a 
microscopic part of the vast reality they are meant to uncloak, for as observes Berlin, 
 
When one considers how many such facts – habits, beliefs – we take for granted in 
thinking or saying anything at all, how many notions, ethical, political, social, personal, 
go to the making of the outlook of one single person, however simple and unreflective, 
                                                
36 In “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Berlin distinguishes the notion of liberty in two senses: a negative sense of non-interference – 
“freedom from;” and in a positive sense conveying the ability to lead a prescribed form of life – “freedom to.” 
37 George Crowder calls this phenomenon whereby Liberty becomes oppression the “inversion thesis.” (Crowder, Isaiah Berlin, 68-71.) 
38 Berlin, Concepts and Categories, 1-14. 
39 Ibid, 3. 
40 Ibid. 
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in any given environment, we begin to realise how very small a part of the total of our 
sciences . . . are able to take in.41 
 
In this passage, Berlin is referring to “sciences” in the sense of the overall scientific 
knowledge, be it of the physical or the human world.42 But even though all gnostic 
pursuits are limited in this way, the author emphasises how the makeup of the inner 
human world is, unlike “the furniture of the external world,” far more difficult to 
“observe and describe”, to articulate into “concepts and categories.”43 Yet, this world, 
“the world of mind and will and feeling”44 is knowable nonetheless. Actually, it is even 
more knowable to man because, contrary to what is generally regarded as a disadvantage 
in the humanities when compared to the natural sciences, man himself is the object of 
study.45 “In history we are the actors, in the natural sciences mere spectators.”46  
 
This is a notion that Berlin inherits from Giambattista Vico, a seventeenth century critic 
of the Enlightenment he was greatly influenced by. In expounding this author’s 
conception of human history, which Berlin subscribes to, he remarks: “The greater the 
man-made element in any object of knowledge, the more transparent to human vision it 
will be; the greater the ingredient of external nature, the more opaque and impenetrable 
to human understanding.”47 According to Vico, there was an “impassable gulf” amid the 
“constructed” (factum, what is made) and the “given” (verum, what is true) along which 
                                                
41 Isaiah Berlin is referring to the “sciences” in the sense of, not just the natural sciences, but the humanities as well. (Berlin, The Sense 
of Reality, 15.) 
42 Berlin explains that the natural sciences aid in the understanding of history, a tale of the human world, but must not confused with 
it: “Under the ‘natural sciences’ I include all those sciences which go to the making of, but are not themselves, historical thought: 
archaeology, palaeography epigraphy, demography, physical geography and anthropology, astronomical, chemical or biological 
methods of dating, and all the other ancillary disciplines which are needed for the measurement of time spans, and all the other 
material factors affecting human life, without which there can be no accurate knowledge of the human past.” (Berlin, Concepts and 
Categories, 325.) 
43 Berlin, The Sense of Reality, 17-18. 
44 Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, 343. 
45 Berlin expands on this idea in this very detailed and illustrative passage: “Human history did not consist merely of things and events 
and their compresences and sequences . . . as the external world did; it was the story of human activities of what men did and thought 
and suffered . . . It was concerned, therefore, with motives, purposes, hopes, fears, loves and hatreds, jealousies, ambitions, outlooks 
and visions of reality; with the ways of seeing and of acting and creating, of individuals and groups. These activities we knew directly, 
because we were involved in them as actors, not spectators. There was a sense, therefore, in which we knew more about ourselves 
than we know about the external world . . .” (Ibid, 342.) 
46 Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment, 109. 
47 Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, 342. (Italics added.) 
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“all provinces of knowledge could be classified (on) this scale of relative intelligibility.”48 
Man can only truly know what he himself has made. And the man-made world is 
significantly different than the surrounding world it attempts to understand through his 
man-made categories. 
 
Kant made the distinction between categories that are equally perceivable to all sentient 
beings because they are based on an exterior world that they share; and those which are 
perceived differently when applied to fields such as history, morals and aesthetics. The 
difference between these perceptions was due, not to the variety of empirical content 
they represented, but to the models, categories or spectacles through which they were 
seen. The subject matter of philosophy is, for Berlin, nor empirical or formal, but “the 
permanent or semi-permanent categories in terms of which experience is conceived and 
classified.”49 If the task of philosophy is to clarify the lenses through which men view 
reality, the task of history is to enable men to experience what reality must have been like 
in another time and place.  
 
Understanding is a different kind of knowledge than the kind that the scientific method can 
grasp. It amasses a much broader and convoluted area of cognition, based solely on 
human experience, at the cost of certainty and verifiability. Berlin called this sort of 
unexplainable knowledge the sense of reality:50 “that sensitive self-adjustment to what 
cannot be measured or weighed or fully described at all - that capacity called imaginative 
insight, at its highest point genius - which historians and novelists and ordinary persons 
endowed with understanding of life (at its normal level called common sense) alike 
display.”51 In further elucidations of this rather obscure notion, the author equates this 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Berlin, Concepts and Categories, 11. 
50 Berlin builds up on this concept from Vico’s notion of fantasia, which is described as an ability to imagine the world as someone 
else by an exercise of imagination, thus resurrecting the past. (Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 67.) 
51 Berlin, The Sense of Reality, 25. 
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understanding to the knowledge that the gardener has as opposed to that of the botanist, or 
that one means when saying he knows a friend, in the sense that he grasps his character, 
his “nuances of personality and feeling.”52  
 
Because morality is an ingredient of this amorphous reality, belonging to the inner 
human world only known to those who experience it, this sense of reality is required in 
order to grasp all that falls out of the very limited knowledge that logical theorems or 
observable data may apprehend. “For the only thing which convinces in matters not 
capable of proof, in the sense in which the propositions of mathematics or logic, or even 
those of empirical science, can be said to be so, is a direct appeal to experience, a 
description of what we think right or true which varies with what our audience has itself 
in some sense, however inarticulately, known or felt.”53 
 
Isaiah Berlin devotes significant attention to the methodological debate between the 
natural sciences and the humanistic fields of study. His scepticism towards the scientific 
method when applied to the understanding of the human makeup, namely political and 
philosophical, had largely to do with his appreciation for variety and nuance among 
human beings, cultures and civilizations. His arguments both on method and on 
pluralism abundantly spring from Giambattista Vico’s ideas, but from one other critic of 
the Enlightenment as well: Johann Gottfried von Herder. These authors’ influence on 
Berlin shall be addressed after another insight into the world of morality is explored. 
 
The failure to acknowledge the much wider and intricate part of the knowable world, “to 
clothe these dry bones in the flesh of living reality,”54 by the eighteenth century’s 
philosophes was, according to Berlin, not only understood, but exaggerated by the 
                                                
52 Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, 352-3. 
53 Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, 16. 
54 Berlin, The Sense of Reality 22. 
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romantics, which created a movement he regarded as “even more revolutionary - far 
newer and more original”55 than all the theses that came before it. Berlin finds in the 
romantic movement a point of rupture in which, not only the blind faith in the promise 
of reason is fiercely opposed, but the perennial assumption that ruled rationalism 
alongside so many other doctrines in western philosophy met its contender: the 





















                                                
55 Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, 11. 
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1.2. THE REALM OF ETHICS 
 
1.2.1. The Roots of Morality 
 
The Enlightenment’s excessive faith in reason ignited a strong counteraction that came 
to be known as romanticism. Fuelled by the perennial desire to find the universal 
answers to all mysteries, the French philosophes aimed to release humanity from the chains 
of unquestioned claims and beliefs that infused the many different cultural heritages they 
regarded with contempt. They thought of themselves as illuminated beings who, because 
they saw the light, believed the rest of the world to be submerged in obscurity. Their 
mission was to return to the cave in order to release the rest of mankind from its chains 
by drawing it out into the sunlight.56 This dry and mechanical outlook, vested in its 
superior attitude, bred in Germany a need to reclaim its value as a nation. The Franco-
Prussian war was the ultimate political expression of this movement that spread through 
the arts, literature and the humanities as a whole, eventually seeping through the realm of 
philosophy and political thought. This age ushered in a plethora of original notions - 
authenticity, uniqueness, passion, variety, sincerity and even unconformity were, for the first time, 
ascertained as values. These notions are still vastly present in contemporary outlooks. 
“(They) transformed our world, and the words in which they were formulated speak to 
us still.”57 
 
At the heart of romanticism, Berlin uproots one thesis he finds has not yet been 
appropriately delineated. Beyond the emergence of new values, a deeper revolution took 
place: a paradigm shift in how values are perceived. Until the nineteenth century 
“whatever view (was) taken, objective or subjective, absolute or relative, naturalistic or 
                                                
56 The philosophes would actualise Socrates’s “Allegory of the Cave” as recounted in Plato’s “Republic,” in book 7. 
57 Ibid, 20. 
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metaphysical, a priori or a posteriori, individualist or social, a statement of value or purpose 
described facts and represented reality. It was obviously crucial that – literally a matter of life 
and death – to discover what the truth in matters of conduct was, that is, what the true 
values were.”58  
 
What was truly original about this movement is that it conceived the possibility of values 
belonging, not to the existing and discoverable world, but to the realm of human 
creation – “The painter creates; he does not copy. He does not imitate; he does not 
follow rules; he makes them. Values are not discovered, they are created; not found, but 
made by an act of imaginative, creative will, as works of art, as policies, plans, patterns of 
life are created.”59 If “will is the creative function,” man makes his own world, which is 
distinctive from any other because it arises from his own unique self, view, choice. 
Humanity is rich in variety, therefore the realm of ethics engulfs, not one, but many 
moral conceptions.  
 
For Berlin, the “true father of Romanticism”60 is Fichte, who interprets the notion of the 
self, the ego, as a “mortal expression” or a “finite entity”61 with a transcendent spiritual 
world. “I am not determined by ends: ends are determined by me,”62 Fichte writes. But 
the influence of this doctrine led to the self being associated with a superpersonal form, 
like Hegel’s notion of the state, Marx’s notion of class or Goethe’s notion of the zeitgeist.63 
Whereas the first interpretation, taken to its extreme, led to the individual’s obsessive 
pursuit of authenticity and singularity, culminating in dissociation with society to the 
                                                
58 Ibid, 13. (Italics added). 
59 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 44. 
60 Ibid, 239. 
61 Ibid, 44. 
62 Cit. Ibid, 240. 
63 Ibid, 44. 
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point of sheer eccentricity, deviancy, lunacy and even irrationalism; the latter led to 
movements such as nationalism, communism and totalitarianism.64   
 
Berlin’s appreciation for the innovative insights precipitated by the romantics did not 
drive him to any of their ultimate consequences, of course, just like his faith in reason did 
not lead him to overestimate its utility. What he did incorporate into his own thought 
was this notion that values belong to a personal dimension, inevitably conditioned by the 
cultural milieu that each individual is absorbed into. “Man is the source of values in the 
sense that values are not independent entities existing apart from people,”65 writes the 
author. For Berlin, as shall soon be explained, values are rooted in man on several levels: 
from mankind, to cultures and individuals. While the first leads to the idea of 
universality, the two other senses are connected to the ideas of diversity and uniqueness. 
Herein lies an unexpected combination of objectivity and subjectivity of ends.  
 
The centrality of choice is, once again, manifest in Berlin’s notion of human nature. 
Values are intrinsic to man as a self-creative being. “By values I mean what I regard as 
purposes in terms of which I live my life, interwoven with other purposes, creating a 
kind of network of purposes,”66 he explains. Indeed, he once remarked: “In a sense I am 
an existentialist.” 67  However, the individual or cultural horizon is created, not by 
inventing, but by choosing values from a universe shared with all humanity.  
 
                                                
64 The argument that romanticism is at the root of the ideological movements of the 20th century is one of the prominent features of 
Isaiah Berlin’s work. Yet, it shall not be explored in this work because it is not essential to the author’s understanding of pluralism and 
its difference from relativism.  
65 Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 203. 
66 Throughout his work, Isaiah Berlin employs several terms interchangeably: “values;” “ends;” “goods;” “principles;” “ideals;” 
“purposes;” “conceptions of the good;” “outlooks;” “constellations of goods;” “ways of life.” The view that values are connected to 
each individual’s outlook is evident when he explained that “values are goods, not virtues, not whole conceptions of the good or 
cultural traditions. Values are things in the light of which I live my life. Values are that which in the end I appeal to. . . . [I]f you 
choose (something) for its own sake, it’s a value for you. There is no need to be good. Values are values. Values are those ends – not 
just by themselves, but concatenations, horizons – they are like networks of those things that I do because they are what they are, not 
a means to something else; ends for the sake of which I do what I do.” (Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 221.) 
67 Berlin and Lukes, “Isaiah Berlin in Conversation with Steven Lukes,” 101. 
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Berlin claims values are objective in the sense that all men are capable of perceiving 
them. This is why Berlin parts from Kant’s understanding of morality – Berlin agrees 
ends are ultimate, but he cannot understand how that attribute is independent from 
personal evaluation. “(T)he values that I sacrifice, as opposed to the values which I choose, 
are the values which I regard as ends in themselves, and not means to other ends.”68 This is 
very different from saying that values are true whether one understands them or not, like 
Kant’s notion of known a priori categorical imperatives.69 “Because when I say right or 
wrong, I mean in the light of values that I, in my personal life, regard as ends in themselves, 
everything else being a means toward them, for the sake of which I am prepared to act, and 
which in some way form, with other values, the constellation of values which shapes my 
way of life.”70 
 
The idea of a creative human self through which different individual and cultural 
outlooks are created is one of the points where pluralism resembles relativism. According 
to Berlin, the claim that values are objective is what keeps these theories apart. 
 
 
1.2.2. The Human Horizon 
 
The two critics of the Enlightenment who most influenced Berlin’s stance on pluralism 
precede the romantics. They are the already briefly mentioned Giambattista Vico and 
Johann Gottfried von Herder – “the fathers of modern historicism.”71 To them Berlin 
attributes the conceptualization of cultural variety as a value and the idea of historical 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 In “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Berlin traces back to this Kantian notion some of the most destructive ideologies of the twentieth 
century, for the notion of a “higher self” or of a “better self” entails that such a self is defined by standards most individuals may not 
know, and therefore lead to ideologies which propose individuals should relinquish their flawed will and behave according to what 
those who are prepared to know the higher self indicate. It is one form of invalidating the human will because it does not match what 
some might consider to be a better version of everybody’s inner-self. (Berlin, Liberty, 197.) 
70 Berlin and Lukes, “Isaiah Berlin in Conversation with Steven Lukes,” 100. (Italics added.) 
71 Ibid, 77. 
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periods and civilizations being incommensurable. Aside from these arguments for 
diversity, Berlin derives evidence of universality from these authors’ works as well. 
Viewing the past through other people’s perspective, attempting to experience the world 
in different ways based on the information they gathered about it, enclosed within it the 
constituent ingredients of pluralism.  
Only because the historian is human is he able to “descend to,” “enter,” “feel (him)self 
into”72 the perspectives of others. “[I]f anything is meant by the term ‘human’, there 
must be enough that is common to all such beings.”73 Therefore, this capacity for 
“imaginative insight,” 74 which Vico called fantasia,75 entails two fundamental revelations 
that set pluralism apart from relativism: (1) it is possible to transcend cultural barriers; 
and (2) values are intelligible because they are conceivable, therefore recognizable, to any 
human being for the sheer fact that they are, indeed, human. As Berlin pointed out, 
 
[T]hey are inviting us to look at societies different from our own, the ultimate values of 
which we can perceive to be wholly understandable ends of life for men who are 
different, indeed, from us, but human beings, semblables, into whose circumstances we 
can, by a great effort which we are commanded to make, find a way, ‘enter,’ to use Vico’s 
term.76 
 
For Berlin, values are, as was earlier demonstrated, intrinsic to human experience, rather 
than exterior entities that can be unveiled by the scientific method. “Without people 
there are no ends,”77 he claimed. The very human condition renders values intelligible, 
even though they may not be known, because circumstances have not yet brought them 
to light. This is to say, it is possible for human beings to value several different ends that 
may arise out of variable contexts. In spite of this variety, however, all of the possibilities 
of what might be valued are enclosed within the limits of what is conceivable by human 
                                                
72 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 85. 
73 Ibid, 63. 
74 Ibid, 62. 
75 Ibid, 67. 
76 Ibid, 82. 
77 Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 203.  
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beings: “Forms of life differ. Ends, moral principles are many. But not infinitely many; they 
must be within the human horizon.”78 All that is humanly possible to value is accessible to all 
those who share the human condition. “Intercommunication between cultures in time and 
space is only possible because what makes men human is common to them, and acts as 
a bridge between them,”79 writes Berlin. 
 
Human nature enables the intelligibility of values, which in turn limits the number of 
values. One can understand (without necessarily accepting) why, in a set of circumstances 
defined by time, space, culture and personal circumstances, one would choose a 
particular value or a set of values to inform their way of life. Human beings are, 
therefore, united in what is conceivably valuable, instead of locked within the 
circumstances they live in, incapable of grasping reality beyond the terms in which they 
learned to view it.  
 
On the other hand, men are united by a set of values they cannot but have – “a 
minimum without which societies could scarcely survive.”80 This notion of a common 
moral minimum cuts across every society – “we cannot help accepting these basic 
principles because we are human.” Which is not to say “there exists an objective code, 
imposed upon us from without, unbreakable because it is not made by us.”81 The 
importance of these notions, the human horizon and the moral minimum, are relevant to 
demonstrate the objectivity of values, not in the Kantian sense of being outside, but in 
the sense of being knowable within the common human experience.  
 
It is the self-creative capacity for choice that instigates the diversity the human horizon 
                                                
78 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 12. 
79 Berlin goes on: “We are free to criticize the values of other cultures, to condemn them, but we cannot pretend not to understand 
them at all, or to regard them simply as subjective, the products of creatures in different circumstances with different tastes from our 
own, which do not speak to us at all.” (Ibid, 11.) 
80 Ibid, 19. 
81 Ibid, 216. 
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harbours. Objectivity and diversity are but two among the three dimensions that enclose 
the pluralist moral landscape advanced by Berlin. “The concrete situation is almost 
everything,”82 he argued. Context, the combination of time and space, is the third 
element that explains the variety of moral outlooks. It is vital on several levels: it 
provides the experience that allows values to be intelligible; it determines the terms, the 
spectacles, through which one conceives values; it narrows the alternative ends one may 
pursue; and it is simultaneously defined by the values one chooses to pursue. Values 
“either choose the people or people choose them. Both happen. You find yourself 
already possessing some ends, but you can change them.”83 
 
The relationship between human nature, choice and context underlies the plural reality of 
conflicting and incommensurable ends that Berlin endeavours to demonstrate. How 
these three elements interact is one of the most confusing and often contradictory parts 
of his work. He is attempting to depict the inner human world as a vessel between 
possibilities and their manifestations on varying degrees of context, that span from the 
most abstract level of what is humanly conceivable as valuable, the human horizon, to 
the very concrete situation that can only be particularly experienced or created by the 
self.84 
 
For Berlin, the fundamental characteristic that is truly defining of pluralism, however, is 
the inevitability of conflict. This aspect, which lends pluralism its tragic component, is as 
old as philosophy itself. In fact, it is what has nurtured the perennial desire for a 
harmonious, constant order of values that prevents the sacrifice of equally valid goods. 
By accepting conflict cannot be evaded, pluralism demonstrates how there can be no 
universal priority of values: they are absolute, ultimate and intrinsically equal. However, 
                                                
82 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 11. 
83 Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 203. 
84 See Chapter 3.1.2. “Context is Key… ‘For Better or Worse,’” which expands on the particular and complex relevance of context 
and the revelation of values.  
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what is typically considered the theory’s most problematic feature is a particular kind of 
evaluative relationship between incompatible ends, incommensurability, for it seems to 
lead to the irrationality of judgment, despite the terms of said judgment being intelligible. 
Berlin does not specify what exactly he means by this, rather using it in several degrees of 
intensity. Yet the notion of incommensurability is one of the most recent philosophical 
conundrums, and there are many more interpretations with which Berlin’s claims would 
also be consistent. In any case, the claim that some values are incommensurable is one of 
the causes for confusion between pluralism and relativism. Therefore, it shall later 
deserve special attention in order to assess the differences between the two theories.  
 
Berlin’s conception of pluralism unveils a moral world that only exists as part of what is 
potentially experienced by human beings. Hence, this world acquires different shapes 
according to the context one can directly experience or imaginatively “enter.” This 
context is comprised of several possibilities that may materialize as one exercises their 
human capacity to choose among what they consider intelligibly valuable. The human 
world is merely united in possibility, which unfolds into a diverse reality as it materializes. 
These alternatives embody values that, as cannot be repeated enough, are not part of a 
cohesive cosmos, being many times incompatible and incommensurable among each 
other. “The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable 
characteristic of the human condition.”85 
 
Yet, the tragedy of choice and the impossibility of devising an abstract order of values 
must not be read as utter implausibility of compromise. “[W]e must not dramatize the 
incompatibility of values—there is a great deal of broad agreement among people in 
different societies over long stretches of time about what is right and wrong, good and 
                                                
85 Berlin, Liberty, 214. 
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evil.”86 These agreements allow one to identify “quasi-universal principles”87 which are 
“enough to base morality on, political as much as personal morality.”88 
 
The human horizon is set by the boundaries of what is recognizably valuable to mankind. 
Beyond the ends one actually pursues, it includes the ends one would also like to pursue, 
but cannot; ends one would never pursue but understands how someone else could; and 
ends one’s experience has not made known, even though they are intelligible if one is 
exposed to the circumstances in which they would understandably arise. Choice and 
context cut across the universality of values within the human horizon, combining it with 
the diversity that also characterizes pluralism.  
 
Context, then, is vital to moral judgements. Yet, Berlin believes the notions of values 
themselves are objective, because otherwise men could not grasp them when remote 
from the specific circumstances from which they emerge. They are objective in the sense 
that they are knowable, intelligible, but not known a priori. Berlin explains, 
 
This judgement . . . depends on how we determine good and evil, that is to say on our 
moral, religious, intellectual, economic and aesthetic values; which are, in their turn, 
bound up with our conception of man, and of the basic demands of his nature. In 
other words, our solution of such problems is based on our vision, by which we are 
consciously or unconsciously guided, of what constitutes a fulfilled human life . . .89 
 
This stand comes very close to cultural relativism, a confusion Berlin insisted on 
dispelling until the end of his life. He believed that relativism was not the only alternative 
to universalism. One could, and should, acknowledge the impact of the terms in which 
the world is conceived - which are inevitably conditioned by the concepts and categories 
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87 Berlin and Polanowska-Sygulska, Unfinished Dialogue, 214. 
88 Ibid, 91. 
89 Berlin, Liberty, 214-5. 
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each person comes into contact with throughout his life journey - without being locked 
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1.3. WINDOWED BOXES 
 
Berlin considered the romantic movement, as has been demonstrated, “certainly the 
largest step in the moral consciousness of mankind . . . the last great transvaluation of 
values in modern history.”92 The notion of values as objects of discovery became 
replaced by the novel idea that values are a human creation. Herein Berlin finds the seeds 
of relativism: “a doctrine according to which the judgement of a man or a group, since it 
is the expression or statement of a taste, or emotional attitude or outlook, is simply what 
it is, with no objective correlate which determines its truth or falsehood.”93 Though similar, 
for Berlin, this perspective is not to be confused with pluralism - the view that values, 
whether of one person, group or culture, may clash or be at odds with each other “does 
not entail relativism of values, only the notion of a plurality of values not structured 
hierarchically.”94 
 
Giambattista Vico and Johann Gottfried von Herder are usually associated with 
relativism, a view Berlin originally partook in. They propounded a historical approach, a 
method of understanding humanity, which valued “the cultural autonomy of different 
societies (whether divided by space or time) and the incommensurability of their systems 
of values.”95 Yet, looking deeper into their work, he found that these authors actually 
tendered pluralist conceptions.  
 
From Vico and Herder, Berlin derives several ideas that shape his own pluralistic 
construction. First, variety is valuable in and of itself. Second, different outlooks arise out 
of different experiences made of “expressions and interpretations, which took the form 
                                                
92 Berlin, Political Ideas in the Romantic Age, 13. (Italics added). 




of words, images, myths, ritual, institutions, artistic creation, worship.”96 Also cultures, 
nations or historical periods are not susceptible of being judged superior or inferior, 
rather being incommensurable with each other. Finally, understanding different 
conceptions of life is, not only possible, but all the more accurate when the analysis takes 
into account the background of those contexts. “Indeed, this notion is not compatible 
with a view of the world according to which truth is everywhere one, while error is 
multiple . . .”97 
 
The difference between the relativist and the pluralist outlooks lied in the possibility of 
knowledge being objective. While Vico and Herder argued that the intelligibility of 
thoughts and actions are relative to context, they did not argue that they were 
“inescapably determined”98 by it. This was, according to Berlin, an idea that would later 
rise through movements such as the German romantic irrationalism, the schools of social 
anthropology and disciplines that explored the notions of illusion and reality from a 
seemingly objective standpoint (psychology and sociology).  
 
Yet the historicism propounded by the authors under consideration was directed at the 
possibility, not the impossibility, of understanding different outlooks beyond their own. 
“The history of ideas offers few examples of so dramatic a change of outlook as the birth 
of the new belief not so much in the inevitability, as in the value and importance, of the 
singular and the unique, of variety as such.”99 The emphasis lies in the idea that men’s 
view of the world is not detachable from his experience of it, which in turn is deeply 
embroidered in the tapestry of his culture. He thinks and expresses himself through the 
“categorical spectacles” that his culture’s identity, language, myths and rites impart. “[I] 
mean that to understand (historical) movements or conflicts is, above all, to understand 
                                                
96 Ibid, 78. 
97 Ibid, 58-59. 
98 Ibid, 80. 
99 Ibid, 58. 
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the ideas or attitudes to life involved in them, which alone make such movements a part 
of human history, and not mere natural events.”100 
 
If the scientific method was guided by the false assumption that all of reality was 
composed of universal laws that, once found, would disclose the single right answer to 
every question; then the historical method revealed a man-made reality comprised of a 
plurality of equally valid possibilities. These historicists do not equate difference, conflict 
or incomparability of values and different outlooks with relativism, nor do they take 
them to mean that there is only one valid answer against multiple mistaken perspectives, 
i.e. monism. “We are urged to look upon life as affording a plurality of values, equally 
genuine, equally ultimate, above all equally objective; incapable, therefore, of being 
ordered in a timeless hierarchy, or judged in terms of some one absolute standard.”  
 
Vico and Herder demonstrated that there is no universal standard or overarching 
criterion according to which cultures can be ranked. Their method revealed the validity 
of variety simultaneously with the objectivity of the values and thoughts within it. This is 
possible because, regardless of the endless manifestations of human life, human they still 
are. If “in the house of human history there are many mansions,”101 no mansion is 
unreachable to those who belong to the same house: Humanity. 
 
Isaiah Berlin found in Vico’s and Herder’s work the first signs of pluralism, for these 
authors managed to construe a multifarious morality that combines universal elements 
with legitimate moral diversity. They are the first to perceive reality in this way, being 
ahead of their time in the sense that they already denied monism without falling into the 
soon to come relativism. The focal element that Berlin derives out of these historicists’ 
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contributions is the argument that communication presupposes something common, 
universal and therefore objective among human beings, underpinning human diversity.  
 
According to Berlin, the objectivity of values, together with the possibility of criticizing 
moral decisions despite cultural and personal influences, amount to the two main 
arguments that set pluralism apart from relativism. Still, the author never succeeded in 
fully silencing relativistic interpretations of his work. The ensuing chapter will analyse 
two outstanding interpretations of Berlin’s pluralism, which culminate in relativism by 
following two opposing paths, in order to assess how strongly Berlin’s arguments sustain 





















TWO CRITICS OF ISAIAH BERLIN 
 
 
For Isaiah Berlin, pluralism arises out of the dismissal of monism without accepting 
relativism, thus combining a degree of universality with a degree of dependability on 
context. Yet, can Berlin’s thesis truly stand as an alternative between these two extremes, or 
does it fall pray to the problems he denounces in both of them?  
 
Two critics of Isaiah Berlin offer deep and provocative reflections of his work: John Gray 
and Leo Strauss. One, with great admiration for both the man and his views, attempts to 
refine them, while inadvertently arriving at a relativist outcome. The other flagrantly 
equates pluralism with relativism, portraying it as part of a wider crisis, which arises out of 
the denial of monism and naturalism.  
 
Both these critics, whether intentionally or not, offer very strong arguments that conflate 
pluralism with relativism. In the spirit of the previous chapter, their most characteristic 
claims relevant to the subject at hand will be exposed. In the end, their most pertinent 
arguments against Berlin’s position will be evinced in order to finally contrast them with 








John Gray is an unconventional liberal thinker who critiques Isaiah Berlin’s views while 
being substantially indebted to them in his own contributions. Seeing himself as “working 
both within and against the liberal tradition,”102 Gray commends Berlin’s positions on 
ethical pluralism and on liberalism for being innovative, in moral philosophy and within the 
liberal tradition respectively. However, he rejects there is an inherent connection between 
them. In fact, he takes Berlin’s argument on pluralism “all the way down,”103 stripping 
liberalism from any universal authority, merely ascribing to it the same validity as that of 
any illiberal regime.  
 
John Gray endorses Berlin’s ethical position, which he qualifies as a “stronger version of 
value-pluralism,”104 for not shying away from the uncomfortable yet true possibility of 
values being, not just uncombinable but, more importantly, incommensurable. This, for 
Gray, not only undermines any monistic or universal claim, including liberalism’s, but also 
recasts the traditional understanding of choice within the liberal tradition.  
 
According to Gray, whereas “all of recent liberalism turns on a conception of rational 
choice . . . from which liberal principles are supposedly derived,” Berlin rather derives “the 
value of freedom . . . from the limits of rational choice.”105 Thus, he terms the author’s 
conception of liberalism as “agonistic,” according to which the unfinished human self is 
created out of both rational and “radical” choices among rivalrous and incommensurable 
goods. When a conflict arises between incommensurable goods, reason is incapable of 
solving it. Therefore, the only possible choice is radical which, instead of being guided by 
rational principles, is at best based on cultural commitments.  
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Gray’s reasoning leads to two critical conclusions: on one hand, it admits that the validity 
of some moral choices may be culturally bound; and on the other hand, it thwarts the 
possibility of a theory or set of principles settling moral dilemmas. The problem with this 
reading of Berlin’s work is that it is evocative, if not indistinguishable, from cultural 
relativism. In this chapter, the main traits of Gray’s interpretation of Berlin’s thought will 
be exposed, thus laying part of the foundation for the main analysis that is object of this 




John Gray identifies conflict as an all-pervasive element in Isaiah Berlin’s thought. The 
term “agonistic,” rooted in the Greek word for “contest,” became mostly characteristic of 
his interpretation of Berlin’s liberalism, but for Gray it is actually agonistic pluralism that is 
the “bottom line in his thought.”106 Both are agonistic in the sense that they hinge on the 
ineradicable aspect of conflict as an integral feature of the human condition. For Gray, 
though, what is truly laudable in Berlin’s conceptualization of conflict is that it grants the 
possibility of some agons occurring between incommensurable values. 
 
Value-pluralism, according to Gray, elicits three main corollaries. First, the “anti-reductionism 
about values” whereby the diversity of human goods has “no common denominator.” 
Secondly, “goods are often incompatible and sometimes rivalrous,” whether they clash 
between themselves or belong to necessarily uncombinable ways of life, therefore 
substantiating a “non-harmony among values.” And thirdly, “there is no summum bonum or 
hierarchy of goods” that permits weighing or ranking values. Not only can values be 
incompatible, but “value-incommensurability” may also occur.107 
                                                
106 Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 37. 
107 Gray, “Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company,” 20. 
 40 
 
Acknowledging Berlin’s imprecision in the use of the term “incommensurability,” Gray 
follows Joseph Raz in clarifying its meaning: “Two valuable options are incommensurable 
if 1) neither is better than the other, and 2) there is (or could be) another option which is 
better than one but is not better than the other.” 108  Both Raz and Gray take 
“incommensurability” to mean “incomparability.” It is not, according to them, “rough 
equality,” for assessing equal validity entails comparable terms. Nor is it “indeterminacy,” 
which arises out of the impossibility of ascertaining the truth or falseness of comparable 
valuable options. Finally, the term is not to be confused with “incompleteness” or with 
“imperfection” in the criteria of evaluation, which is to say, the vagueness or uncertainty of 
the categorization or ranking of valued objects. In fact, it is when a moral conflict is 
beyond all these contiguous alternatives that one is surest to be faced with 
incommensurable options. The consequence of incommensurability or incomparability, is 
not indifference toward the merit of values, but, as Raz puts it, “the inability of reason to 
guide our action.”109  
 
For Gray, one further implication of incommensurability in ethics ensues: “the reality of an 
ultimate diversity of incomparable forms of human excellence or flourishing (and of an 
equal diversity of incomparable evils.)” 110  Insofar as pluralism applies to non-moral 
values,111 it is actually a “thesis of abundance, not scarcity.”112 Yet when moral values are 
concerned, pluralism cannot but be besieged by an element of tragedy. Choice, with its 
inherent sacrifice of deeply cherished values, is inevitable. It is the concoction of conflict 
and incommensurability that spawns the central problem with this thesis: “Value-pluralism 
                                                
108 Cit. Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 86. 
109 Cit. Ibid, 88. 
110 Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 88. 
111 Since Gray does not elaborate, John Kekes presents a good account of the difference between moral and non-moral values. The 
former require a correlation between human beings, whereas the latter consist of either an independently experienced benefit by a 
person, or a benefit that is derived from nonhuman sources. For instance, the possession of a material good in and of itself in a non-
moral value. Yet if one illegitimately comes into the possession of an item that is known to belong to another, the action of returning 
said item to its owner would be qualified as moral. (Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism, 45.) 
112 Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 80. 
 41 
bites, as a position in ethical theory, when it is further maintained that such diverse forms 
of human flourishing are not only rationally incomparable, but also uncombinable, and 
sometimes constitutively or necessarily uncombinable.”113 This inherent competitiveness of 
values is precisely what renders it worthy of the term “agonistic.”  
 
Gray identifies the manifestation of pluralism on three separate but inseparable levels. A 
very nuclear level, where conflicts within values, such as liberty, occur due to their complex 
nature riddled with rivalrous and incommensurable elements. On a second level, ultimate 
values may clash within a moral system ranging from particular ways of life to entire 
cultural traditions. Finally, diversity may also arise out of different cultural forms. This last 
level, which Gray calls “cultural pluralism,” is by his own admission where pluralism 
becomes most easily confused with cultural relativism: 
 
[D]ifferent cultural forms will generate different moralities and values, containing many 
overlapping features, no doubt, but also specifying different, and incommensurable, 
excellences, virtues and conceptions of the good.  
. . . There are goods that have as their matrices social structures that are uncombinable; 
these goods, when they are incommensurables, are also constitutively uncombinable. This 
is the sort of incommensurability that applies to goods that are constitutive ingredients in 
whole ways or styles of life. This is the form of incomparability among values, cultural 
pluralism, that is most easily confused with moral relativism . . .114 
 
John Gray actually concedes that Berlin’s views involve a degree of relativism. Indeed he 
admits that “relativism about ideals of life cannot be avoided.” But this measure of 
relativism within pluralism does not culminate in that theory’s consequences, for even 
though moral outlooks are culturally bound, “ideals are not beyond criticism.”115 The 
difference between the theories resides in the distinction between ideals of life and 
universal values. “Contrary to moral relativists,” argues Gray, “there are generically human 
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goods and evils; but such universal values do not amount to a universal morality, for there 
is no right way of settling their conflicts.”116  
 
To be sure, it is not that cultures are incommensurable, thus shielded from the possibility 
of being rationally evaluated. “They are different ways of settling universal conflicts, and 
when their worth cannot be compared it is because no one settlement is best or right.”117 
Gray’s use of the word “when” indicates that it is not among cultures as such that 
incommensurability arises. Cultures are only exempt from judgement beyond their own 
terms “when” a particular conflict of incommensurables brings their different 
combinations of universal values to a stalemate. This conflict can be experienced between 
collective entities and within one individual swayed by diverse cultural influences. 
 
Isaiah Berlin’s ethical position is, for John Gray, discernible from relativism as well as 
subjectivism and scepticism because all these philosophical stances deny precisely what 
pluralism implicitly asserts: “We have knowledge of moral reality.” Based on their 
experience, human beings genuinely “know” that conflicts between irreducible and 
incommensurable values occur. The author finds in Berlin’s thought what he deems “a 
variant of ethical realism118 (which) asserts a moral reality that is undetermined, in that 
although its contents are highly determinate, as are their conflicts, there is no ‘right answer’ 
when these values are among incommensurables.”119 
 
Gray’s interpretation of Berlin’s pluralism is intricately connected to his understanding of 
the role choice plays as a convergence between a general human nature and its particular 
and diverse cultural expression. To better apprehend his overall reading of Berlin and his 
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particular exegesis of the author’s agonistic pluralism, these converging elements must be 
further elucidated. 
 
2.1.2. Flourishing Humanity 
 
John Gray derives from Isaiah Berlin’s conception of human nature a historicist notion of 
the self, in which choice plays a central role. “We make ourselves what we are,” he claims, 
“in circumstances that are not of our making – through . . . the choices we make among the 
incommensurable goods and evils we confront unavoidably in our lives.”120 Human beings 
are thus portrayed as self-transforming creatures who are partly authors of, and partly 
conditioned by, their cultural heritages. Simultaneously, cultures are partly creators and 
partly regenerated by human beings. “Self-creation through choice-making occurs not only 
in individual life but also collectively.”121  
 
Thus Gray detects a romantic streak in Berlin’s thought whereby choice, as a function of 
self-creation, is an integral component of human life. Yet, human beings do not create 
themselves ex nihilo, “for the self that transforms itself through the choices it makes is itself 
unchosen.”122 Each individual charts their identity out of the terms through which they 
have experienced life. In a sense, culture does have a determining effect on human beings 
but only to the extent that they are capable of redefining their cultural influence for 
themselves and return it as an influence on others that can resonate throughout the overall 
cultural outlook, thus renewing it. For Berlin, Gray writes, “choice-making is a power of 
agents whose identities are always partly inheritances.”123 Accordingly, human nature is 
conceptualized in a historicist perspective, but contrary to historical determinism, the 
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human will is the fundamental determining element, for identities are “historical creations” 
of an “inventive species.”124  
 
Hence, the self is an unfinished entity whose purpose is not the unattainable completion or 
perfection, but its diverse expression, which is a value in and of itself. “Human beings 
constitute themselves, not only as individual agents, but as practitioners of diverse cultural 
traditions, with distinctive collective identities . . . each with its own history.”125 Gray’s 
qualification of Berlin’s account of human nature will soon be expounded, but for now, it 
is important to note that he understands it as being common but not universal or 
homogenous. Diversity is not derived out of variations of the same nature, as Hume126 
understands it, “rather, diversity is the most evident expression of man’s nature as a species 
whose life is characterized by choice.”127  
 
In fact, it is in Berlin’s characterization of human nature that his romantic persuasion is 
most evident, for he contends that no truer or higher self can be discovered or realized. 
Instead, each self is singularly created through choice, with no final destination in sight. It 
is “perpetually reinvented . . . and it is inherently plural and diverse.”128 Of course the 
diversity of human identities, whether individual or collective, arises out of the impossibility 
of combining all human values in one single life or conception of the good. Identities are 
partly defined by the exclusion of values that cannot be realized together with the ones that 
are chosen, attesting to a moral reality of “pluralist expressivism.”129  
 
The reality of agonistic pluralism conflates with that of the historical self, hence 
conditioning the terms by which choice creates distinctive moral expressions of life. 
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Human nature and moral pluralism have, then, a bearing on choice itself. If, as Gray 
echoing Raz believes, incommensurability “marks the inability of reason to guide our 
action,”130 then the alternative to rational choice is “radical choice – choice without criteria, 
grounds, or principles.”131 But, precisely because the self is not constituted ex nihilo, radical 
choice is merely groundless in reason, for the will does not necessarily choose randomly in 
the absence of rational guiding principles. Decisions are often “summations or precipitates 
of our experiences and of the forms of life to which we belong.”132  
 
Gray actually deemphasises the voluntarist element in Berlin’s conception of the self when 
claiming “radical choices may well not be reason-based and yet not be acts of will.” Most 
radical choices are rather best characterized “as retrospective reconstructions of human 
experience,” or “expressions . . . of identities and forms of life that the choosing self 
already partakes of.” 133 How is this view different from cultural relativism, which according 
to the same author is “the view that human values are always internal to particular cultural 
traditions and cannot be the objects of any sort of rational assessment or criticism?” 134  
 
Gray lays hand of Berlin’s arguments against relativism in his own rejoinder to this 
recurring criticism that is directed at him as well. He retorts that, even though values may 
be preferred based on cultural inheritances, their knowability is based on a common moral 
framework known to all humanity. In other words, moral values are universal even though 
moralities are not. Furthermore, the cultural basis of certain choices does not render all 
choices immune to moral judgement.  
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Gray readily denies any semblance of a common human nature, as it is customarily 
formulated, in Isaiah Berlin’s conception of it. Choice and its inherent diversity infuse 
human nature with a mutable and dynamic quality as opposed to an unalterable and static 
one.135 Notwithstanding, he reckons Berlin identifies a “common framework of moral 
thought as having a substantive content that is universal,” thus pointing toward a “constant 
core in human nature, a common human nature, from which the universal element in morality 
springs.”136 In this “universal element” resides what mainly sets pluralism apart from 
relativism, but in no way does it entail universalism. “When faced with universal conflicts, 
people can reasonably solve them in different ways. Particular moralities, or ways of life, 
are – at least in part – local settlements of universal conflicts. The moral minimum that 
Berlin has in mind is universal in the sense that it is to be sought everywhere. That does not 
mean it will be everywhere the same.”137 It is Gray’s interpretation of this particular 
implication of “universality” in pluralism that leads to his most characteristic claim about 
Berlin’s views: the denial that pluralism entails liberalism, or any other universal moral 
claim. 
 
John Gray argues that, even though pluralism and liberalism are connected in many ways, 
Berlin cannot consistently defend pluralism while advocating the fundamental importance 
of the value of negative liberty. “The argument between value-pluralism and liberalism 
fails,” writes the critic, “because the range of worthwhile forms of life is . . . wider than any 
that can be contained within a liberal society.”138 In other words, the author believes there 
are worthwhile ways of life that are illiberal. Such outlooks are worth preserving so long as 
they have no universalist pretention, like Marxism or Christianity, or even if particularist, 
they are not radical such as nationalism. Such legitimate systems according to Gray, would 
be the case of Hinduism, Shintoism or Orthodox Judaism. Instead of universal liberalism, 
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the author would later advance the proposal of a “modus vivendi” among different moral 
systems, which is merely a means to finding terms where common ends among different 
legitimate outlooks may be achieved, thus enabling a “peaceful coexistence.”139 This view 
would be more consistent with what he believed was Berlin’s true position: that even 
though pluralism entails nothing, it can support a moral minimum in which not only 
negative liberty, but several essential values would be precariously held in equilibrium. 140 
 
This priority of a moral minimum over the value of liberty John Gray detects causes him to 
conclude that “Berlin is not so much a theorist of liberty as a philosopher of human 
decency.” 141  His commitment to an unbiased interpretation of pluralism seems to 
approximate the theory’s implications with those of relativism, for he legitimizes any 
system that may supress values which he himself acknowledges are part of a minimum of 
decency so long as they do not aspire to be universally applicable. These more problematic 
statements will be carefully analysed in the third chapter in order to reach an answer to the 
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Leo Strauss is an extant custodian of naturalism in the thick of what he deems the “crisis 
of modernity.” His critique of Isaiah Berlin’s contribution as part of this crisis is concise, 
but striking nonetheless. Yet, in vindicating Natural Right, his legacy carries with it an 
overall rebuttal against all views emanating from the romantic movement, thus producing 
a weighty case against them. Therefore, many arguments that lie beyond his direct 
analysis of Berlin’s proposal are, not only applicable to it, but of great significance to the 
present analysis. 
 
The same premise that stands as evidence of pluralism for Berlin, is precisely what 
galvanizes Strauss into the central pursuit of his philosophical career: “the problem 
posed by the conflicting needs of society cannot be solved if we do not possess knowledge 
of natural right.”142 The contrast between the two thinkers could not be more glaring. 
The repudiation of what is at the core of Strauss’s endeavour is precisely what lies at the 
core of Berlin’s thinking: “the possibility of conflict – and of tragedy – can never wholly 
be eliminated from human life,” which in turn means, “that the belief in some single 
formula can in principle be found . . . is demonstrably false.”143  
 
Notwithstanding, these authors have more in common than meets the eye. Both delve 
into the history of ideas to ground their claims; both are wary of the effort to apply to 
the humanities a methodological approach resembling that of the natural sciences, thus 
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stripping their conclusions of what is fundamentally human in a blind attempt to be 
“objective;” both denounce relativism as a morally isolating view that confines moral 
judgement to particular contexts thus annihilating the possibility of judging right from 
wrong beyond them; and both consider values to be objective and knowable.  
 
More importantly, Strauss and Berlin agree on the fundamental premise that makes them 
leap in opposite directions: values conflict. What sets them apart is that one believes 
there is one, yet to be uncovered, final solution to moral conflicts; while the other believes 
there are many valid, but conflicting, solutions demonstrable by “ordinary experience.”144 
Whereas Berlin regarded Strauss as a believer in the “ancient faith”145 in “some remote, 
or incoherent, ideal,”146 Strauss considered Berlin’s position “entirely relativistic,” thus 
becoming a “characteristic document of the crisis of liberalism.”147  
 
For Strauss, then, Berlin’s pluralism is no more than a reluctant and inconsistent version 
of relativism, earning him the lead in his critical essay “Relativism.” The problems 
Strauss detects in this author’s pluralism echo his general claims about the “crisis of 
modernity,” which can be succinctly characterized as a loss of purpose arising from the 
questioning of the very foundation of liberal convictions - the belief in natural right 
edified upon the bedrock of ancient philosophy. Therefore, the ensuing exposition of 
this critic’s point of view will begin by broadly setting his main position as the 
background of his critique of Berlin’s ethical stand, which will be later analysed in detail 
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2.2.1. The Modernity Crisis 
 
Leo Strauss’s main contention is that only knowledge of natural right can provide a 
reliable standard by which the conflicting needs of society can be rationally solved. He 
believes the success of the United States as a nation is due to its earlier unrelenting faith 
in its founding principles. Yet, the author suspects that, once the influence of German 
thought hit its shores, the famous passage “We hold these truths to be self-evident . . .” 
which harbored the convictions that account for it being “the most powerful and 
prosperous of the nations of the earth,”148 became no longer representative of its 
people’s beliefs. Modern thought ignited a crisis in liberalism. Once the rational basis for 
freedom was abandoned, liberalism lost its basis altogether. 
 
The denial of natural right means that, at best, that desired standard can merely be found 
within the confines of what is humanly known, which in turn is conditioned by each 
civilization’s ideals. Since these ideals are only measured against the standards of the 
civilization they belong to, they cannot but be equally valid when compared to those of 
other civilizations. The consequence of this denial breads relativism and ultimately 
nihilism. 
 
According to our social science, we can be or become wise in all matters of secondary 
importance, but we have to be resigned to utter ignorance in the most important respect: 
we cannot have any knowledge regarding the ultimate principles of our choices, i.e.,  . . . 
our principles have no other support than our arbitrary and hence blind preferences.”149 
 
Strauss is well aware that a “wish is not a fact.”150 The mere need to find an absolute 
solution to moral conflicts is not reason enough to justify its existence. He presents two 
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key arguments against the crisis that cast doubt on the moral framework underlying 
liberalism.  
 
First, even though knowledge of natural right cannot be proved, neither the possibilities 
of it existing or of it being rationally knowable have yet been disproved. Not only is the 
“‘consent of all mankind’” irrelevant for demonstrating its existence, but, if natural right 
is rational, it cannot be universally known without the cultivation of reason – “one ought 
not even to expect any real knowledge of natural right among savages.”151 
 
Second, if an absolute standard is denied, then what are any of the modernist claims 
based on? In other words, how true can theories such as nihilism, relativism and possibly 
pluralism be if there is no ultimate truth to be affirmed?  
 
The grounds on which the social sciences152 reject natural right, according to Strauss, are 
History on one hand, and the distinction between Facts and Values on the other. The 
arguments he presents on both these fronts are reiterated in his attack on Berlin’s 
pluralism. Therefore, the analysis of these contentions will provide for a more cemented 
examination of his final claim, which is no more than the object of the present reflection: 
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2.2.2. The Historicist Loophole 
 
Isaiah Berlin is no doubt influenced by historicism and by nineteenth century German 
thought. His conception of human nature and his position on scientific methodology 
owe these currents a great deal of inspiration. Moreover, as an empiricist, it is history that 
sustains Berlin’s main premise, according to which, values conflict and may be 
incommensurable between each other. It is, therefore, of the highest import to attend to 
Leo Strauss’s disquisition on the subject for he is one of its most pronounced and 
revered critics. 
 
Leo Strauss considers the historicist critique of natural right is truly aimed at human 
thought as such, for the rejection of its existence is attributed to the incapability of man 
knowing it. Whereas earlier dismissals of natural right were due to a high regard for 
nature, resigning human affairs such as right and justice to the imperfect and arbitrary 
realm of social convention,153 the modern historical view rather rejects the notion of 
nature being of a higher order altogether. Either man and his varying conceptions of the 
good belong to the realm of nature, or they are placed alongside it, belonging to a realm 
of freedom or history.  
 
Philosophy, according to Strauss, is classically conceived as the attempt to grasp the 
eternal, “to ascend from the cave to the light of the sun,” which is to say “from the 
world of opinion as opposed to knowledge.”154 Historicism, though, confines human 
thought to the realm of opinion, to “the cave,” thus deeming it incapable of grasping the 
eternal.  
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History, then, is the ultimate source of knowledge, the highest authority. What is natural 
is, not uniformity, but the individual. Liberation resides in the pursuit of each man’s 
version of happiness. These versions or choices are equally valid, not susceptible to being 
judged superior or inferior to each other. The lack of common standards, either between 
individuals or entire civilizations, entails that their choices cannot be measured outside 
themselves. There is, therefore, no end to history, for all moments in it are equally valid 
with no progress between them. Accordingly, history cannot be finished. It is an endless 
process.  
 
All universal norms are thus discredited. Standards, resting only upon free choice, 
become subjective; therefore no objective grounds upon which to judge right from 
wrong remain. In other words, historicism opened the way to nihilism. “The attempt to 
make man absolutely at home in this world ended in man’s becoming absolutely 
homeless.”155  
 
Since human thought is historical, choice presupposes a frame of reference. But if 
reasoning is necessarily based on one among many comprehensive views of the whole, 
these views cannot be validated by reason itself. They are all equally legitimate, rendering 
choice among them utterly groundless, unsupported by any certainty other than choice 
itself.156 What is interesting about this argument is not the awkward implication of 
groundless choice proving once again the need to secure an absolute standard. Rather, 
Strauss is pointing out the most significant inconsistency in historicism, and hence the 
genetic deficiency in all the modernist philosophical views it inspires. If reason is based 
on a particular frame of reference, and by implication absent beyond its confines, then 
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historicism is either relative to one frame of reference or a mere groundless claim. Either 
way it is not an absolute truth, or perhaps it is proof of universally valid knowledge. 
“Historicism cannot deny this possibility. For its own contention implies the admission 
of this possibility.”157 
 
Strauss invalidates historicism using its own argument against it on two fronts. On one 
hand, by claiming to be universal, historicism admits the possibility, not to mention the 
necessity, of a universal truth. On the other hand, if human thought is historical, 
therefore ephemeral, historicism, as a human realisation, cannot but be temporarily valid.  
 
Aside from this fundamental contradiction, one other inconsistency is detected by 
Strauss. “Historicism explicitly denies that the end of history has come, but it implicitly 
asserts the opposite.” Hegel proposed that “every philosophy is the conceptual 
expression of the spirit of its time.”158 If there is one particular time in which the truth of 
historicism is made evident, then such a claim can only be made because this time is 
assumed to be the end of history. Any overall claim about humanity would require a peak 
moment to occur. This would mean that there is at least one moment in time that is 
superior to others in terms of the awareness of reality. 
 
Leo Strauss seemingly succeeds in unveiling historicism’s inherent contradictions. But 
the author also finds within it proof of some all-pervading truth. History appears to 
reveal, especially concerning philosophy, that certain themes and problems are constant 
despite their varying formulations across time and space. “If the fundamental problems 
persist in all historical change, human thought is capable of transcending its historical 
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limitation or of grasping something trans-historical.” 159  There is, therefore, an 
“unchanging framework”160 in human thought, regardless of the historical period it 
belongs to. 
 
Leo Strauss detects a loophole in the historicist’s thesis, whereby its own assertion 
rescinds its validity. By claiming there is no universal truth it empties its own claims of 
any sustainability, for what good is a truth about humanity that is only momentarily or 
relatively valid? Indeed, the historicist denial of an absolute standard, placing its only 
standard within the unsteady reality of time and culture, is bound to infuse all of its 
conclusions with their characteristic unsteadiness. Until now, Strauss’s view of the 
consequences of renouncing the existence of an absolute standard have been exposed. In 
the next chapter, the author demonstrates another loophole: how the attempt to proceed 
without any standard whatsoever is impossible. 
 
Even though Isaiah Berlin admittedly was not influenced by Max Weber’s ideas, both 
thinkers present strikingly similar views. The most glaring difference between the two lies 
in their take on methodology within the social sciences. Weber, as “the father of 
sociology,” advocated a neutral approach that, as earlier demonstrated, Berlin could 
never accept. Differences aside, these thinkers seem to share the same underlying 
premise in their different conceptions of morality. Apart from the historicist lineage that 
permeates both authors’ ideas, Weber believes that, according to Strauss, “there is a 
variety of unchangeable principles of right or of goodness which conflict with one 
another, and none of which can be proved to be superior to the others.”161 Therefore, it 
is pertinent to examine two of the arguments which Strauss directs at Weber, since he 
then reiterates them against Berlin: one demonstrates how historicism, once again, is no 
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more than a self-refuting loophole; while the other questions the validity of the 
“empirically grounded” claim in which both authors ground their overall 
conceptualizations. 
 
In “Relativism” Strauss directs the same criticism at Berlin he had earlier aimed at Weber. 
“Experience,” he writes, “knowledge of the observable Is, seems to lead in a perfectly 
unobjectionable manner to knowledge of the Ought.”162 Just like for Berlin, as for Vico 
and Herder for that matter, Weber’s historical approach entails “understanding people in 
the way in which they understand themselves.” 163  For this thinker, a clear 
“understanding” requires a judgement free attitude towards its subject, which in turn 
warrants a fundamental distinction between facts and norm of value - between Is and 
Ought. In order to faithfully accomplish this feat, “understanding people in the way in 
which they understand themselves”164 requires, by implication, understanding values as 
they are understood by the people whom the social scientist intends to understand. 
Therefore, Strauss notes, “ the social scientist would have to bow without a murmur to 
the self-interpretation of his subjects.”165 There is, consequentially, a conflation between 
the Is and the Ought, utterly voiding the distinction between them. The human 
scientist’s frame of reference is underpinned by the fluctuating realities of culture and of 
time. Either way, historicism leads to relativism. 
 
So evaluation is inevitable. Not only in ordinary human thought, but in contemplating 
human thought. Assuming the claim that there is no rank among values is correct, can it 
really be held that no value system is better than the other? Is the system that privileges 
one value over another equally valid to the one that allows for two values to partially 
coexist? In Strauss’s words: if “there is no hierarchy of values . . . a social scheme that 
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satisfies the requirements of two values is preferable to one whose scope is more 
limited.”166  
 
This conclusion begs one final question about the fundamental claim about the 
conflicting nature of morality both Berlin and Weber make. “The question,” the critic 
asks “is whether that premise has really been demonstrated, or whether it has merely 
been postulated under the impulse of a specific moral premise.”167 In other words, 
Strauss returns to his fundamental argument: on what grounds, or by what standard, can 
one claim historicism, nihilism or relativism to be the absolute truth?  
 
As a naturalist, Leo Strauss’s critique of anyone who denies an absolute source of 
morality beyond human nature is truly aimed at the foundations of his claims. His 
critique of Berlin is no different. Indeed, so long as this author derives pluralism from 
“ordinary experience,” a temporary standard, Strauss inevitably asks what of its validity if 
it cannot be timeless? In other words, can pluralism stand the test of time? This question 
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2.3. RELUCTANT ACCOMPLICES 
 
The two critics of Isaiah Berlin under analysis stand for opposite positions. John Gray is 
a resolute pluralist while Leo Strauss, an abiding monist. Curiously, though, when 
considering Berlin’s work, whether unwillingly or intentionally, both reach similar 
conclusions that convert pluralism into relativism. 
 
John Gray commends Berlin for breaking with the existing liberal tradition by 
acknowledging its rational limitations when claiming values are not only conflicting but 
incommensurable. Following Raz, he believes incommensurability marks the limits of 
rational choice, thus relaying moral decisions to the realm of cultural fate. This view 
places pluralism remarkably close to cultural relativism, for it seems to condition the 
validity of each choice to the standards of each culture. On the other hand, Gray claims 
that pluralism necessarily undermines any universal view, including liberalism, thus 
believing Berlin is mistaken in his argument that pluralism supports liberalism. He 
believes Berlin truly meant to claim pluralism sustains a minimum of decency, which is 
comprised of universal yet conflicting and incommensurable values. Therefore, negative 
liberty, even though part of this nucleus, has no overriding power over other values, thus 
undermining liberalism’s universal validity. Accordingly, Gray proposes a theory of modus 
vivendi, which merely attempts to find terms of compromise among legitimate cultural 
outlooks.  
 
If Gray’s possible confusion between pluralism and relativism is inadvertent, Leo 
Strauss’s is quite intentional in his interpretation of Berlin’s pluralism as relativism. For 
Strauss, any theory that rejects the truth of an absolute standard, i.e. of natural right, is 
necessarily a version of either relativism or nihilism. His pertinent criticism of Berlin’s 
pluralism finds the need for an “absolute stand” inconsistent with the claim about the 
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equal validity of values. Therefore, he asks two questions: how is one to determine, laying 
hand of Berlin’s aforementioned words, the “truth or falsehood” of any moral judgement 
without an absolute standard?; and if the truth of pluralism is grounded in “ordinary 
experience,” which is by any historicist view a fluctuating standard, how can pluralism 
and its correlated value of negative liberty be a universal truth?  
 
Interestingly, it seems that Gray and Strauss are fighting for opposite causes armed with 
the same weapons, for there is a parallel in their arguments for and against pluralism 
respectively. On one hand, both Gray and Strauss argue that incommensurability or 
equal validity will render the legitimacy of moral judgements dependent on variable 
standards. On the other hand, Strauss’s second question is identical to Gray’s claim that 
pluralism undermines liberalism or any universal morality. In fact, both these authors 
reach the same conclusion that Berlin’s pluralism cannot consistently support universal 
liberalism.  Strauss even goes further by implying that pluralism actually undermines 
pluralism.  
 
Given these preliminary considerations, the following assessment of whether Berlin’s 
pluralism holds against his own defence from relativism shall unfold under two 
questions: what are the implications of incommensurability for the validity of moral 
choice?; and can any universal claim be derived from pluralism or made about it? The 
first question will shed light on the possibility of moral judgements being considered true 
or false, while the second will dwell on the meaning of objective values, thus examining 








PLURALISM V. RELATIVISM: THE TRIAL 
 
Isaiah Berlin’s arguments against relativism essentially amount to the following two: 
values are objective; and ethical judgements are not immune to moral criticism. From a 
relativist’s standpoint, a moral decision is, in the author’s own words “simply what it is, 
with no objective correlate which determines its truth or falsehood.”168 
 
However, both John Gray and Leo Strauss advance arguments that undermine this 
position. It is the purpose of this chapter to assess whether Berlin’s defence of pluralism 
against relativism stands the tests posed by those two critics. In order to do so, despite 
being intertwined, each of Berlin’s arguments as stated above shall be analysed against 
the backdrop of those author’s interpretations.  
 
In “Truth Among Plurality,” the possibility of knowing moral truth and falsehood will be 
juxtaposed with two characteristic claims Berlin makes about pluralism: values are 
incommensurable and context dependent. In “Kaleidoscopic Universe,” the notion of 
the objectivity of values, which is for Berlin derived out of their universality, will be 
examined from two opposite ends: that of its implications and that of its foundations. 
Once Berlin’s defence against relativism has faced its trial, by having each of his two 
arguments face a twofold appraisal, “The Verdict” on their soundness shall at last come 
to fruition.  
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3.1. TRUTH AMONG PLURALITY 
 
3.1.1. The Capability for Moral Choice 
 
Isaiah Berlin claims the ability to judge right from wrong beyond context is one of the 
factors that separate pluralism from relativism. This argument is often considered 
vulnerable because incommensurability and context are characteristic elements of 
Berlin’s conceptualisation of values. 
 
It has been repeatedly stated throughout this study that choice is the crux of Berlin’s full 
array of convictions. For John Gray, however, it is not any choice, but only one 
particular kind of choice that lies at “the heart”169 of those convictions: radical choice. 
The crucial type of conflict in Berlin’s “agonistic pluralism” 170 is, for the critic, the 
conflict between incommensurables.  
 
Following Raz, Gray believes that incommensurability “marks the inability of reason to 
guide our action.”171 The critic derives two consequences from this interpretation. First, 
“there is no ‘right answer’ when  . . . conflicts are among incommensurables.”172 Second, 
choice will be, not arbitrary, but grounded in contextualized experience. “Berlin’s belief 
that choice-making is . . . deeply shaped by the language and form of life that is 
contingently theirs, is bound to qualify his idea of radical choice,”173 writes Gray. If 
context is the surrogate of reason when it is absent, then the standards of choice are 
solely confined to it. Pluralism appears to become like relativism. 
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171 Cit. Ibid, 88. 
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So the first vulnerability of Berlin’s argument about moral judgement is his claim about 
incommensurability because it precludes the existence of a “right answer” and relegates 
choice to the miscellany of cultural domain. However, context is a central feature of 
Berlin’s pluralism regardless of incommensurability. It alone represents the second 
vulnerability of Berlin’s argument for, like relativism, it is essential not only for the 
revelation of values, but for their many possible combinations, conflicts and priorities.   
 
Like Berlin, Gray believes that “ideals are not beyond criticism.”174 Neither, however, 
substantiate this claim. The ensuing subchapters will assess the implications of 
incommensurability and contextual influence for moral judgment. 
 
3.1.1.1. Incommensurability and Moral Reasoning 
 
What did Isaiah Berlin actually mean by the term “incommensurability?” George 
Crowder ventures in the strenuous task of inventorying Berlin’s many uses of the term. 
The author concludes that Berlin alternates between a moderate and a radical version of 
incommensurability, even though it appears Berlin may have even used the term in all 
three senses Crowder unearthed. Sometimes, when referring to the impossibility of 
weighing values on a “scale,” 175  Berlin is using the term in the sense of 
“immeasurability,” according to which there is no common currency that permits the 
quantitative evaluation of values. But this sense is rather weak, 176 for even though it 
denies a cardinal order of values, it still allows for ordinal ranking, which allows values to 
be ranked in reference to a quality. But Berlin denies this in instances when he admits no 
term of comparison whatsoever. In this stronger connotation, incommensurability means 
                                                
174 Gray, “Reply to Critics,” 327. 
175 For example, in a footnote in “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin writes “it may well be that there are many incommensurable kinds 
and degrees of freedom, and that they cannot be drawn up on any single scale of magnitude.” (Berlin, Liberty, 177.) 
176 As notes George Crowder, the term incommensurability always means immeasurability for value-pluralists, “but it is not the whole 
of what they usually understand by that idea.” (Crowder, Liberalism & Value Pluralism, 51.) 
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“incomparability,” resulting in the arbitrariness of choice. This is the sense that 
incommensurabilists such as Raz and Gray adopt.177 Finally, Crowder finds in Berlin a 
more moderate meaning of incommensurability, according to which values cannot be 
ranked in the abstract, but can be ranked when put into context. Crowder assumes 
Berlin’s use of the term in these varying degrees is discrepant and therefore designates 
this latter sense as the author’s “better view,”178 for the strongest meaning of the term, 
“incomparability,” would render pluralism equal to relativism.179  
 
Assuming incommensurability means incomparability, the position soon to be 
expounded is still similar to Crowder’s. Even if a ranking of values may not be possible 
in some concrete circumstances, incommensurability is more manifest among values in 
the abstract. Indeed, context plays a determining role in moral decisions by substantially 
restricting, and possibly eliminating, the occurrence of incomparability.  
 
The philosophical debate on incommensurability “is as yet in a very early stage.”180 
Interesting arguments have demonstrated that, when put to the test, what many 
philosophers intend to convey by using the term as described by Raz181 can actually be 
accounted for in some other way. This can be explained by a gradual refinement in the 
terminology used to explain moral reasoning.  
 
                                                
177 Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism, 49-52. 
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180 Chang, “Introduction,” 1. 
181 Joseph Raz notoriously defines incommensurability as: “Two valuable options are incommensurable if 1) neither is better than the 
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Since choice is for Berlin a constitutive element of human nature, evaluation, whether 
moral or not, is an intrinsic function of reason. “To think is to generalise, to generalise is 
to compare.”182 His view of moral reasoning can be explained in light of what is the 
standard theory for most incommensurabilists: “comaparativism.” This theory assumes 
“all choice situations are comparative,”183 based on the “trichotomy thesis” according to 
which relations of value can be either better than, worse than or equally good.184 When the 
trichotomy cannot apply to a value relation, the result is regularly assumed to be 
incomparability, circumventing the possibility of justified choice. This is the position held 
by Raz. But this theory merely describes the conclusions a comparison may lead to 
instead of explaining how comparative reasoning in morality actually operates.  
 
Ruth Chang has deeply contributed to the terminological refinement of moral evaluation. 
It is not possible to explore how her work reveals the many ways in which apparent 
incomparables are in fact comparable, but the following considerations shall suffice to 
illustrate at least two sides of value-dynamics present in Berlin’s work.  
 
For Chang, “all comparisons necessarily proceed in terms of a value.” The author 
advances terms such as “covering value” and “choice situation” that when ill-defined 
lead to most incomparabilist arguments.185 Each “choice situation,” then, balances values 
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positive if a comparison holds between it and negative if nothing can be said about it. This is to say, a value relation is either positive or 
negative whether one can say or cannot say two values are better than, worse than or equally good in relation to one another. Based 
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in reference to a “covering value,” which is roughly “what matters” in that situation. 
Claiming values are evaluated “in reference” to other values is the same as saying that 
values are compared “in relation” to each other.  
 
Values are relative to values. This points to one of the senses in which Berlin certainly 
employed the term incommensurability: “To assume that all values can be graded on one 
scale . . . seems to me . . . to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide-rule 
could, in principle, perform.”186 Pluralism, as opposed to monism, accepts there is no 
one standard that can hierarchise the totality of ends that men are capable of pursuing. 
“[E]nds (are) equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute.”187 They can be ordered in a 
myriad of ways according to the many values that can serve as standards of comparison 
between them. Much like the chemical elements listed in the periodic table, all ends are 
equally valid in themselves and may materialize in a variety of ways depending on which 
other values they may come into contact with.  
 
At this very high level of abstraction, the relationship among values unfolds into a 
kaleidoscopic panorama of different constantly shifting assemblages. These concoctions 
are narrowed by context. Chang advances another very elucidating distinction between 
“intrinsic values” and “bearers of value,” drawing a line between the reference to values 
as abstract notions and values concretely instantiated in particular circumstances.188 This 
distinction helps demonstrate how the degree of comparability increases when referring 
to the latter compared to the former, just like Crowder proposes.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
on these terms, Chang concludes that “two items are incompatible with respect to a covering value if, for every positive value relation 
relativized to that covering value, it is not true that it holds between them.” (Chang, “Introduction,” 5-7.) 
186 Berlin, Liberty, 216. (Italic added.) 
187 Ibid, 213. 
188 “Following Chang,” declares Steven Lukes, “I shall say that comparison is best thought of as holding between ‘particular bearers of 
value’ – ‘between goods, acts, events, objects and states of affairs that instantiate or bear value (or disvalue), not between abstract values 
themselves. Thus we want to know whether, with respect to the goodness of places to live, an economically poor community with 
breathtaking landscapes is better than a moderately prosperous community blanketed with unsightly features and smokestacks – not 
whether, with respect to the value, goodness of places to live, the value of beauty is better than the value of prosperity.’” (Cit. Lukes, 
“Comparig the Incomparable,” 63-64.) 
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One of Berlin’s recurring examples of value conflicts pertains to freedom and security. 
“Security, and indeed freedoms, cannot be preserved if freedom to subvert them is 
permitted,”189 he noted.  One cannot compare freedom and security in terms of worth in 
the abstract, but one can judge that in a situation of calamity, security overrides freedom, 
and that under oppressive conditions, people are willing to sacrifice security by fighting 
for their liberty. In circumstances of stability, on the other hand, a compromise between 
the two values is usually in place. Indeed, both Berlin and Bernard Williams second this 
idea when saying “the pluralist path . . . will accept that a value which has more weight in 
one set of circumstances may have less in another.”190  Liberty and security, when 
pondered in a situation of calamity, are truly being weighed “in relation” to a third value: 
life. Like freedom, the value of life is a complex value. In different circumstances, 
different aspects of the value of “life” are prioritised: life preservation and quality of life. 
They either totally or partially nullify each other. Yet none of them lost their essential 
importance in human life.  
 
In sum, incommensurability is a symptom of abstraction. The more concrete a moral 
challenge is made the more likely it is for a comparative evaluation to yield a positive 
result, which is to say to determine whether a value option is either better, equal or worse 
than another. 
 
3.1.1.2. The Significance of Incommensurability 
 
Incommensurability is, no doubt, a characteristic element of pluralism as the antithesis of 
monism, for it deflects any harmonizing ambitions. But how significant is it for practical 
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choice? As was just demonstrated, conflict among incommensurables is quite a rare 
occurrence in the immensity of particular conflicts one faces throughout life.  
 
It is interesting to observe that the term at issue is scarcely present in Berlin’s key 
statements on pluralism. In “Two Concepts of Liberty” the term only makes an 
appearance once, in a footnote.191 Yet the word “conflict” is mentioned sixteen times. 
Similarly, in “The Pursuit of the Ideal” incommensurability also appears only once 
whereas the term conflict appears five times, six if one counts the word “conflicting.” 
Moreover, in what is perhaps his most complete definition of pluralism,192 the term 
makes no appearance at all. Granted, in the final section of “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 
Berlin does write “that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in 
perpetual rivalry with one another.”193 But this very quote points precisely to how 
incommensurability is merely a possible occurrence within the inevitable reality of 
conflict – the “perpetual rivalry” between values. In fact, when Steven Lukes asks Berlin 
about the possibility of values being incommensurable, he at once clarifies: 
“Some are.”194  
 
Gray, of course, would likely find this conclusion no more than a ploy to avoid an 
uncomfortable truth. However, Gray misplaces the cause of his and Berlin’s conclusion: 
the reason why values cannot be singularly ranked has more to do with the equal validity 
of ends in themselves, not so much incommensurability and the limits of reason. “[W]e 
are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the 
realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others,”195 Berlin 
said. It is equal validity that demonstrates there are not one but many valid answers to 
                                                
191 Isaiah Berlin uses incommensurability in the strict sense mentioned earlier: “It may well be that there are many incommensurable 
kinds and degrees of freedom, and that they cannot be drawn up on any single scale of magnitude.” [Berlin, Liberty, 177. (Italic 
added.)]  
192 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 83.  
193 Berlin, Liberty, 216. (Italic added.) 
194 Berlin and Lukes, “Isaiah Berlin in Conversation with Steven Lukes,” 103. 
195 Berlin, Liberty, 213-214. 
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moral conflicts. Moreover, Berlin many a time cautioned against exaggerated 
interpretations of his doctrine – “we must not dramatize the incompatibility of values - 
there is a great deal of broad agreement among people in different societies over long 
stretches of time about what is right and wrong, good and evil.”196 If the inevitability of 
conflict is not to be overstated, then, by Berlin’s terms, Gray is overplaying the 
importance of one particular kind of conflict, the conflict among incommensurables. 
 
What is characteristic of pluralism is the multiplicity of goods as opposed to their unicity, 
not the inability of reason to solve some dilemmas. Reason, in fact, determines which 
values square up in a dilemma, even though it may not be able to decide it by 
determining which value is “better than” or “worse than” the other. In such cases, 
reason shows values in conflict are either equally good or incommensurable. For 
practical reason, it must be asked, what difference does a choice between conflicting 
equally good ends make from a choice between conflicting incommensurable ends? Does 
the fact that, according to the trichotomy thesis, the first is the positive result of a 
comparison whereas the second is a failure of the trichotomy to hold, make a difference 
to the one who is choosing? The result is the same, because there will be a sacrifice of an 
equally right alternative.  
 
Therefore the possibility of incommensurability within a concrete situation, even though 
not disproved, merely accounts for some types of choices. For practical terms, it makes 
no difference whether to sacrifice or to compromise an incommensurable value or an 
equally good value. But this argument merely lays the foundations for the real question at 
hand: if values are tied, whether incommensurable or equally valid, is it possible to 
determine the truth or falsehood of a moral claim?  
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3.1.1.2. The Question Overhaul 
 
Gray claims “there is no ‘right answer’ when  . . . conflicts are among 
incommensurables,”197 while also arguing that “ideals are not beyond criticism.”198 Is 
there a contradiction? The very formulation of the question “how to determine the truth 
or falsehood of a moral choice” is misleading as to the problem it seeks to expose. Its 
language is reminiscent of a fallacy - the perennial fallacy.199 The phrasing of the question 
seems to imply there is only one right answer when a choice need be made. It is not that 
the language is necessarily wrong, but it is likely to be read in a misleading way: “how to 
determine which moral choice is true?”  
 
This potential interpretation assumes a moral dilemma can have only one true solution or 
right solution. But according to pluralism, a moral dilemma can lead to more than one 
“true” answer, just as it can lead to more than one “wrong” answer. “[P]luralism,” argues 
Berlin, “merely denies that there is one, and only one, true morality or aesthetics or 
theology, and allows equally objective alternative values or systems of values.” 200 
Therefore, a more unambiguous formulation of that question would be: “if there are 
many equally valid ends, is it possible to discern which are true and which are false in a 
particular context in which they collide?”  
 
Whether objective values are known within the common moral minimum or actually 
known across the wide range of possibilities enclosed in the human horizon,201 “what is 
clear is that values can clash”202 on both levels. In fact, choice would scarcely be much of 
a burden if ends were susceptible of being ranked. Herein monism is discredited. It is not 
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the choice between good and evil, between better and worse, that is difficult. It is the 
challenge between goods or between evils that is truly taxing. Why? Because, in the first 
case, the chosen good can never compensate for the loss of the other,203 and in the 
second case there is simply no gain whatsoever. In fact, a choice may very well lead to a 
simultaneously right and wrong option. “[S]uch conflicts are sometimes tragic, in that 
whatever we do, we commit a wrong”204 Gray observes. 
 
This has no bearing on the truth or falsehood of ends as such. The need to choose 
indeed leads to the prevalence of one value over another in case of conflict. But this does 
not mean that the choice is necessarily truer or better than the one not chosen. There is a 
fallacy whereby it is assumed that an actual choice entails the value-demotion of the 
unchosen alternatives. What does follow from the need to choose is the evidence of 
conflicting ends, whether in the form of goods or of evils. Because ends are ultimate, 
meaning they are “values which I regard as ends in themselves, not means to other 
ends,” the act of choice reveals that they are, to the one who chooses, if not better or 
worse, as equal as the alternatives they sacrifice – “the values that I sacrifice, as opposed 
to the values I choose, are the values which might be equally ultimate for me.” 205 
 
The pluralist universe allows for many different possibilities that human beings, through 
their natural capacity for choice, may elect in detriment of the other possibilities.  
 
These values, almost if not entirely universal, are not always harmonious with each other. 
Some are, some are not. . . . Justice has always been a human ideal, but it is not fully 
compatible with mercy. Creative imagination and spontaneity, splendid in themselves, 
cannot be fully reconciled with the need for planning, organization, careful and 
responsible calculation. Knowledge, the pursuit of truth—the noblest of aims—cannot 
be fully reconciled with the happiness or the freedom that men desire.206 
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Choice merely charts a course amid alternatives, which would be equally valid if chosen, 
for the simple fact that the act of choice implies the sacrifice of an alternative.  
 
3.1.1.4. Moral Choices 
 
What are the implications of incommensurability for moral reasoning? The answer 
appears to be twofold. First, when applied to values in the most abstract of senses, 
incommensurability entails the impossibility of the single universal order monism strives 
for. This means there are many possible rankings of values. Second, context has a 
narrowing effect on all types of conflicts, usually revealing the relevant terms of 
comparison. Though on this level the conflict between incommensurables is not very 
significant, it does not cancel out the possibility of “a,” not “the,” right choice being 
made. Incommensurability, like the conflict among equally valid ends, means there is not 
just one valid choice in a given situation. As Gray pointed out, in the absence of rational 
principles, choice will be guided by the moral inclinations imprinted by experience, which 
have a rationale of its own. 
 
The conflicting nature of moral ends and the inevitability of choice among them is 
pluralism’s central claim, not because values are relative to different contexts, but 
because they are ultimate components of mankind’s universe of values. This is, indeed, 
why pluralism is the antithesis of monism, which presupposes that the answers to such 
questions fit into a “cosmic jigsaw puzzle.”207 There are two main confusions regarding 
this statement. One is the belief that, by itself, the lone revelation that values conflict, 
without the element of “incommensurability,” adds nothing new to what philosophy has 
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always acknowledged. Not only does this claim unduly overemphasize the importance of 
this characteristic, it misplaces the main claim of pluralism: the inevitability of conflict 
points to the fact that values are equally ultimate. Moral philosophy may have always 
recognized moral conflict but, as Berlin tirelessly pointed out, most of it denied its 
inevitability, and probably none of it considered it evidence of the equal validity of values 
in abstraction. 
 
The other frequent confusion, often leading to the conviction that pluralism is as 
disturbing as relativism, is that the claim that there is no one best value or order of values 
means that there can be no “right” choice whatsoever. “We know that nothing we do is 
right because, whatever we do, we do something wrong,”208 as Ronald Dworkin put it. 
Yet, monism, as an alternative, does not necessarily prevent the sacrifice of a valued end 
just because it claims the priority of one higher value as “right.” Pluralism, though, claims 
that there may be more than one “right” priority and corresponding sacrifice of values to 
a particular dilemma. 
 
3.1.2. Context is Key… “For Better or Worse” 
 
Both Relativism and Pluralism claim values are context dependent. Only, they do it 
differently. For the first, context is both source and boundary of evaluation standards.209  
The truth about values is thus limited to cultural or personal interpretation, to their 
“windowless boxes”210 or “impenetrable bubble(s).”211 In pluralism, on the other hand, 
context plays a much more complex role, with multiple layers across which variety and 
objectivity meet.  
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Both theories find in context the key to the revelation of values, for the knowledge of 
values is directly connected with the experience of reality. Though pluralism, unlike 
relativism, does not confine a moral outlook to an individual experience or a cultural 
outlook. Values are objective in the sense that they are intelligible to all those who share 
the human condition. The only sense in which they are wholly dependent on context is 
that they belong to the “context” of human experience. Of course, “being human” is 
experienced differently by each person, both individually and as part of a community. 
But the knowability of values transcends that particular experience. 
 
Values are universal in the sense that they stem from the common experience of 
humanity, i.e. a “context” that is universally known to all who live through human life. 
“[I]f anything is meant by the term ‘human’, there must be enough that is common to all 
such beings,”212 Berlin observed. There is, therefore, a common context that underlies all 
particular contexts life can generate, thus enabling men to understand humanity better than 
anything else they cannot actually experience. This idea is evocative of the Vico inspired 
notion of man being better capable of understanding the world he shares with other men 
than the world he does not share with, say, a rock - “His deepest belief was that what 
men have made, other men can understand.”213 
 
What holds this fluctuating moral cosmos together is human nature, and what indicates 
its presence is the ability to communicate among those who partake in it. The 
intelligibility of values is the sufficient condition of their objectivity while remaining 
empirically known within a common human nature. “The possibility of . . . 
communication between human beings, depends upon the existence of some common 
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values, . . . Those who are out of touch with the external world are described as 
abnormal or, in extreme cases, insane.”214  
 
The conception of human nature, i.e. of human context, is twofold: 215 a combination of 
a “human horizon” and of a “common moral minimum.” The difference between these 
two dimensions of universality is marked by what is possibly valuable and what is 
necessarily valuable to each person if they are to be considered human at all. The horizon 
sets the limits of what is humanly conceivable in terms of value while the minimum core 
is comprised of the values that are inevitably experienced in any human life. Hence, 
Berlin consistently grounds human diversity and human universality within a range of 
several degrees, which extend from a common center to a kaleidoscopic periphery of 
conceptions of the good. The totality of possible values correlates to humanity as a 
whole, which within it contains several different combinations of goods expressed in 
singular lives as well as collective traditions.  
 
This kaleidoscopic periphery is pervaded by an immense variety of equally valid 
combinations, or “constellations of values,” which vary according to different cultural 
backgrounds and personal experiences. Therefore, particular contexts which are both 
space-bound and time-bound provide the circumstances “in reference” to which values 
can be ordered. In sum, the interaction between context and values, according to the 
pluralistic understanding, occurs at many levels: the most abstract level of what is 
humanly conceivable as valuable – the human horizon; an intermediate level given by the 
cultural environment one experiences, which provides the terms and concrete 
possibilities the individual may know; the particular circumstances in which choices are 
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actually made among alternatives that cannot all harmoniously coexist; and, of course, 
the context one creates for oneself as one ponders the alternatives that, even though not 
all simultaneously pursued, are the makeup of one’s moral universe, for they constitute 
what one’s experience has enabled oneself to value. 
 
This means that, even though each person can only abide by certain values in a given 
time and place, they remain free to conceptualise beyond their momentary constrains and 
choose otherwise.216 “Values change. . . . (One can) suddenly see the universe in a 
different fashion,”217 Berlin noted.  
 
There is one more sense in which context bears relevance for this distinction, which 
correlates to the problem discussed in the previous chapter. If context reveals values, it 
can also have a distorting effect that leads to a misguided understanding of their 
application. In other words, an inadequate understanding of context may lead to the 
“falsehood,” rather than the “truth” of a moral outlook.  
 
Values, while remaining within the human horizon, may be “falsely” conceptualized 
because other elements of the “understanding” of reality are misconstrued. “I see how, 
with enough false education, enough widespread illusion and error, men can, while 
remaining men, believe . . . and commit the most unspeakable crimes.” Such was the case 
of the Nazis for Berlin. This conception of values is not beyond the understanding of 
those who do not share it, for when faced with the same “false belief about reality, one 
could come to believe that they are the only salvation.” 218  
 
This is an error about context, not about the notion of values themselves. If one is 
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convinced that human worth is variable according to race, and threatened by inferior 
kinds, then it is understandable that the interpretation of the value of “life” may lead to 
the belief that those menacing breeds should be eradicated. 219 However, “a man to 
whom it literally makes no difference whether he kicks a pebble or kills his family”220 is 
beyond human understanding. Herein lies a crucial difference in the implications of a 
relativist versus a pluralist understanding of values. For the first, Nazi values are morally 
“true” because their validity is grounded in the conception of that social context. For the 
pluralist, context, even though essential for the intelligibility of values, may lead to a false 
conception of them when some elements of that context are falsely construed. The 
possibility of judging certain cultural or personal interpretations of morality as either true 
or false is thus consistent with Pluralism. 
 
For Isaiah Berlin, Pluralism opposes Relativism in the sense that context is always an 
enabler of moral judgment without confining it. Still, the same element that enables 
morality to be known, can also distort it when falsely construed. It is one thing to say one 
can only practice what their context permits and an entirely different thing to say that 
one cannot see and evaluate alternative possibilities as ethically right or wrong. How this 
is to be done remains the ultimate question of philosophy even though that no 
philosophical endeavour can fully satisfy it. It was Berlin’s conviction that the task of 
philosophy was to clarify the “categorical spectacles” through which man construes 
reality: 
 
It is certainly a reasonable hypothesis that one of the principal causes of confusion, 
misery and fear is . . . blind adherence to outworn notions, pathological suspicion of any 
form of critical self-examination, frantic efforts to prevent any degree of rational analysis 
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of what we live by and for. . . . The goal of philosophy is always the same, to assist men 
to understand themselves and thus operate in the open, and not wildly, in the dark.221  
 
But that is not the direct aim of pluralism, though. The theory rather claims that there 
may be several morally valid options that can be accepted or rejected by people who do 
not adhere to them. The impossibility of moral judgment outside of one’s moral outlook 
is not one of its direct implications, as is the case with relativism. Hence, it seems Berlin 
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3.2. KALEIDOSCOPIC UNIVERSE 
 
On the surface, Berlin’s conception of human nature appears to be loaded with 
inconsistencies. He combines a romantic inspired notion of a creative, mutable and 
unfinishable self with a common human nature marked by the shared intelligibility of 
moral goods. This apparent contradiction dissipates once one considers the twofold 
notion of universality presented by the author, which combines the human horizon and 
the common moral minimum. 
 
The notion of a common minimum is apparently reassuring until one realizes that, yet 
again, its content is both vague and thin, and is still shaped by a plurality of conflicting 
equally valid ends. As George Crowder observes, “the historical record provides little 
evidence of anything actually desired or admired by all human beings except goods or 
virtues described at the highest level of generality.” 222  A parallel between Berlin’s 
description of the common moral minimum and H. L. A. Hart’s notion on “the 
minimum content of natural law” is usually drawn. According to this author, “without 
such a content laws and morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival 
which men have in associating with each other.”223  
 
Even though the determination of the content of the moral minimum224 is extremely 
pertinent, it is not necessary to dwell on it in order to ascertain whether Berlin’s claim of 
the universality of values is a sufficient condition for the distinction between pluralism 
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and relativism. 225 In order to do so, this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the central 
conclusion both John Gray and Leo Strauss arrive at, even though they are arguing 
opposite positions: pluralism subverts liberalism. They write, respectively: 
 
Though pluralism in ethics and liberalism in politics may be connected in a number of 
ways, none of these linkages can secure the universal primacy of the value of liberty that 
Berlin at times asserted.226 
and, 
[I]f he had limited himself to saying that liberalism is merely his ‘own subjective end,’ not 
intrinsically superior to any other subjective end, that . . . no conclusive case can be made 
for or against liberalism . . . he would never have contradicted himself.227 
 
Although the conclusions of these two critics are strikingly similar, these authors 
emphasize two different aspects of the same problem: the implications of pluralism for 
any universal moral claim on one hand; and the epistemic inconsistency of universal 
claims when empirically grounded, namely that of pluralism and of liberalism. 
Accordingly, the problem shall be examined from these two different angles. 
 
 
3.2.1. Pluralism of Universals: Theoretical Implications 
 
John Gray argues that the truth of pluralism is inconsistent with any universal moral 
claim, including that of liberalism. In his own words, “what Berlin plausibly argues is that 
value-pluralism can be used to support a moral minimum, precarious, shifting and ridden 
with conflicts, which has priority over any political ideal.”228 Simultaneously, Gray holds 
that “there is nothing distinctively liberal about the moral minimum that Berlin proposes 
                                                
225 In any case, Jonathan Riley proposes: “Berlin’s objective value pluralism is constrained to give priority to a core set of human 
rights and associated sphere of liberty. This minimum of human rights constitutes a generally accepted standard of humanity, or 
threshold of human decency, which is not necessarily fixed. The threshold of decency may be represented as a boundary line that 
divides the common moral world into two zones, to wit, a zone of decency above and including the boundary, where human rights 
are respected, and a zone of indecency below the boundary, where human rights are violated. (Riley, “Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Minimum of 
Common Moral Ground,” 72.) 
226 Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 5. 
227 Strauss, “Relativism,” 140. 
228 Gray, Isaiah Berlin, 5-6. 
 80 
here: as a prescription for decency it will no doubt include some reference to negative 
liberty, but liberty will have no overriding importance.”229 For the critic, if pluralism is 
true, then liberalism is as valid as any illiberal regime. In other words, liberalism is only 
relatively valid to the liberal moral outlook that privileges liberty as an overriding ideal. It 
appears, however, that the very position by which Berlin is inconsistent implicates Gray 
himself in a blatant contradiction in terms.  
 
First, a misinterpretation of Berlin’s liberalism must be clarified. Berlin in no occasion 
affirms, and in many instances expressly denies, that negative liberty, or any kind of 
liberty, has an overriding value. “Nothing that I assert,” says the author “should be taken 
to mean that freedom in any of its meanings is either inviolable, or sufficient, in some 
absolute sense.”230 Why, then, does he believe pluralism entails liberalism? Because both 
are underpinned by choice. To be a pluralist is to admit there are many legitimate 
conceptions of the good, therefore if one is a pluralist, one necessarily believes there 
should be freedom of choice. More importantly, because choice is such an essential part 
of what it means to be human, then it cannot but be a part of the moral minimum. 
Therefore, Berlin’s argument is not that liberty is an overarching value, but that it is an 
essential one. It’s “universal” moral claim “is no more than a minimum; its frontiers are 
not to be extended against sufficiently stringent claims on the part of other values, 
including those of positive liberty itself.”231 
 
Gray himself admits that “the idea of a moral minimum is the claim that we should strive 
to settle moral conflicts in ways that do least damage to universal human values” 232 and 
that it “will no doubt include some reference to negative liberty.”233 This position is, in 
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fact, compatible with his esteemed conception of a self-creative human nature. Yet he 
considers that there are “worthwhile forms of life which will be compromised or 
destroyed, by the exercise of freedom of choice.”234 Gray patently contradicts himself by 
asserting that the values withheld in the minimum core, of which liberty is “no doubt” 
part (especially given that it is so vital to the very notion of human nature), must be done 
the “least damage,” while at the same time defending that a way of life that is jeopardized 
by the freedom of choice is worthwhile. 
 
The contradiction runs even deeper. Gray argues that if pluralism is taken “all the way 
down,”235 then illiberal ways of life are just as legitimate as liberal ones, so long as they 
make no universal claim. He thus proposes a theory of modus vivendi, 236 according to 
which a peaceful coexistence between a diversity of equally valuable forms of life is 
pursued, not as an ideal, but as a means to an end that is generally valued by all those 
societies. 237  But how could such “peaceful coexistence” be attained without non-
interference, which is to say, without negative liberty?  
 
Gray contrasts universalist views of life, such as Marxism, Christianity or Islam, against 
particular conceptions like Hinduism, Shintoism or Orthodox Judaism. Assuming these 
conceptions are actually not universalist, what Gray is arguing is that they are legitimate 
so long as they accept there are other ways of life that are equally legitimate. As Berlin 
observed, this merely means that “the Shintoists are liberal with respect to the rest of the 
world. If you are a pluralist, there must be somewhere where a choice different from 
your own is permitted.”238 So what Gray is actually standing for is that illiberalism within 
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a particular system is legitimate so long as it is liberal without? This brings this analysis to 
its final point. 
 
John Gray, as a resolute pluralist, sustains his positions by interpreting pluralism “all the 
way down.” Yet, when presenting his understanding of value-pluralism, he noted “the 
way” encompassed three separate though intertwined levels: among different cultural 
forms; within any morality or code of conduct; and within complex values themselves.239 
So why should modus vivendi or negative liberty be applied between different moral 
outlooks and not within them, allowing these values to compete on all three levels? In 
fact, if one considers the other argument against relativism, it is possible to discern right 
from wrong ways of life in reference to objective standards, namely the ones which are 
almost timelessly held as true – the minimum core. This begs the question: how can one 
way of life, which constantly suppresses one of the minimum values of mankind, be 
good or decent? Either Gray admits, as he does, that there are standards by which the 
morality of a way of life can be assessed, or he is, by his own terms, advocating 
relativism. 
 
In sum, John Gray, despite misinterpreting Berlin, actually contradicts himself by arguing 
that the author’s notion of pluralism is consistent with the priority of a moral minimum, 
which “no doubt” includes negative liberty, while at the same time considering illiberal 
regimes legitimate ways of life. “Berlin is not so much a theorist of liberty as a 
philosopher of human decency,” 240 Gray remarks. Yet it rather seems that because Berlin 
is a philosopher of decency, he believes negative liberty is essential among a moral 
minimum core. 
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In refuting Gray’s arguments, it has hopefully been demonstrated how the universalism 
of equally valid ends contained within pluralism need not lead to cultural relativism. 
Rather, because such values are universal, it means that any decent society should pursue 
them, albeit in different ways. Concerning Gray’s position, however, there is one 
question left unanswered: What good is modus vivendi, a theory that legitimizes different 
political systems structured in accordance with different moral outlooks, in a globalized 
world such as the one we now live in? This is to say, in a world that is evermore 
demanding of political coordination beyond local boundaries, with every day multiple 
clashing conceptions of the good, “peaceful coexistence” is an end mostly sought within, 
rather than without this new global society. This question will be later addressed as this 
study is concluded. Before, that, one further question requires elucidation – Can 
pluralism stand by its own standards or, like relativism, is it self-refuting? 
 
 
3.2.2. Universal Pluralism: Theoretical Foundations 
 
Leo Strauss made it his life mission to guard the truth of natural right, denouncing by 
implication any theory based on historicism as a symptom of the modern crisis of 
liberalism. Therefore, his critique of Berlin’s pluralism is mainly directed at its empiricist 
foundations. In a detailed analysis of ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,” he begins by addressing 
the problem of the conflicting validity of negative and positive liberty, but only to shift 
his attention from the “location” to the “status”241 of the frontiers of liberty. The focus 
of this chapter will also be aimed at this part of his critique, since the other question is 
not essential to ascertain the difference between pluralism and relativism.242 
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Strauss mainly accuses Berlin’s thesis of being a reluctant kind of relativism. Indeed 
starting by addressing it in an essay, precisely entitled “Relativism,” he finds Berlin’s 
position even more contradictory than ordinary relativism, for not only is it self-refuting, 
but it proposes there are universal principles. “The demand for the sacredness of a 
private sphere needs a basis, an ‘absolute’ basis; but it has no basis,”243 the critic observes. 
 
The critic begins by pointing out that Berlin grounds the moral minimum in his idea of 
human nature - a historicist conception. He remembers the author’s words about such 
minimum rules and commandments: “they are accepted so widely, and are grounded so 
deeply in the actual nature of men as they have developed through history, as to be, by 
now, an essential part of what we mean by being a normal human being.”244 Strauss 
therefore asks: how can empiricism, “the experience of men until now,”245 serve as basis 
for any eternal principles? The problem, for this author is, if “ordinary experience”246 is a 
mutable reality, from which one derives precisely the multiplicity of equally legitimate 
ends and moral views, then how can any universal claim be asserted, including the one 
about its own existence? In other words, if there is no reference to an absolute and fixed 
reality, then all claims can merely be relatively valid. Those “sacred frontiers” are only 
sacred in the present context, not beyond them. 
 
According to Berlin, one criterion for establishing such “sacred frontiers” is that their 
absence leads to “inhumanity.”247 But Berlin’s most pertinent argument concerning the 
                                                                                                                                      
admits on many occasions that it competes and many a time is less important than other values. Castello Branco writes referring to 
Strauss’s interpretation: “A existência de ‘fins em si mesmos’ ou de ‘valores últimos,’ seria por si só, suficiente para demonstrar a 
impossibilidade do pluralismo e, com ela, a incoerência da ideia de liberdade negative. Uma tal interpretação, porém, não poderia estar 
mais afastada da verdade que o pluralism afirma. De facto, de outra forma não se poderia entender o próprio pluralism, já que o que 
este afirma é, precisamente, não a inexistência de valores absolutos, mas antes o conflito entre eles.” (Castello Branco, “Pluralismo, 
Liberdade e Tolerância,” 190-191.) 
243 Strauss, “Relativism,” 138. 
244 Berlin, Liberty, 210. 
245 Strauss, “Relativism,” 139. 
246 Berlin, Liberty, 213. 
247 Ibid, 53. 
 85 
foundations of his claims is that history, even though ridden with so much diversity, is 
also stable enough to reveal certain patterns from which one can draw universalizable 
truths, including of course those pertaining to morality. Such patterns correspond to 
“categories” that can be perceived by everyone who shares the human condition.  
 
To share such a condition means there is an experience of reality that is common to all 
those who bear it. “Such permanent features are to be found in the moral and political 
worlds too: less stable and universal, than in the physical one, but just as indispensable 
for any kind of intersubjective communication, and therefore for thought and for 
action.”248  
 
Interestingly, Strauss himself seems to share this view when, in “Natural Right and 
History” he criticises historicism based on, well, historicism itself. He observes that “if 
the fundamental problems persist in all historical change, human thought is capable of 
transcending its historical limitation or of grasping something trans-historical.”249 Berlin 
argues exactly the same thing when saying that “categories which, if not eternal and 
universal, are far more stable and widespread than those of the sciences; sufficiently 
continuous, indeed, to constitute a common world which we share with medieval and 
classical thinkers.”250 The most enduring and coherent conceptual system is thus the 
ultimate “empirical test”251 for assessing the adequacy of the basic categories of thought 
and moral evaluation. “Sacredness” is thus derived from that which is less variable in 
experience or, in other words, from constant experience. 
 
So far, Berlin almost stands Strauss’s challenge, being even well served by this author’s 
arguments against his position. He is saying that one can infer universal aspects of 
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human thought from their constancy throughout the diversity of human experiences 
enclosed within history. Yet, Strauss points out one more contradiction, perhaps the 
ultimate one, in Berlin’s thought: Berlin claims history is unfinished and unfinishable, 
while at the same time arguing that “principles are not less sacred because their duration 
cannot be guaranteed.”252 In so doing, Berlin is conceding there are timeless truths. But if 
the source of values is based in what can be known to man, which is to say on what can 
be experienced, then principles only “exist” temporarily, for experience is far from a 
timeless reality. Moreover, Berlin denied the existence of a priori truths – “I don't know 
what it would be like to recognise certain beliefs as being true independently of what 
anyone might possibly think.” 253  
 
Strauss questions how can eternal principles be based on empiricism. Such situation 
would require, he argues, “the possibility of a peak experience, of an absolute moment in 
history, in which the fundamental condition of man is realized for the first time and in 
principle fully. But this would also mean that in the most important respect history, or 
progress, would have come to its end."254  
 
Berlin, like Vico and Herder, denied the idea of progress. However, Strauss’s observation 
points out that the discovery of “sacred principles” from experience would necessarily 
require moments that are, so to speak, more aligned with the “truth.” So these moments 
would be “better” than the moments when that knowledge has not yet been found or 
has been forgotten. Such a judgment implies the admission of progress. In fact, as 
Strauss notes when criticizing not Berlin, but Weber, if there is a variety of values, 
despite there being no hierarchy among them, “a social scheme that satisfies the 
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requirements of two values is preferable to one whose scope is more limited.”255 In other 
words, a time that allows for the knowledge of more values, of more principles, is again a 
“better” time than times that only acknowledge a portion of said values. Indeed, Berlin 
actually acknowledges this when he remarks: “The whole value of discovering the past 
and studying other cultures is to understand more, so that you understand yourself 
better.”256 Yet he denies the notion of an historical evolution as a “march of events (that) 
can plausibly be represented as a succession of causes and effects,” leading to an end.  
 
It appears that one cannot admit the possibility of judgment without admitting the 
notion of progress, for to say one moment is better than a preceding one is, by 
definition, saying there was progress between the two. Berlin can only be consistent in 
denying progress and accepting judgment if he applies that term in two different senses. 
He rejects progress in the sense that there is no final purpose to which the succession of 
cultures leads. They are incommensurable as Vico and Herder proposed, a part of a 
“historical cycle” with “their own expressions and interpretations” of their “own 
autonomous values.”257 But, on the other hand, Berlin accepts the possibility of some 
cultures being better than others based on their wider and clearer recognition of moral 
universal principles. Otherwise, he would fall into relativism according to his own terms. 
In fact, Berlin even conceded that Vico was “in a sense” a relativist, for he believed “that 
one culture was in no position to criticize the values of another.”258  
 
By defending pluralism is different from relativism because it admits there are “objective 
correlate(s)” which determine the “truth or falsehood” of moral views, Berlin need not 
admit an “end” to history is necessary, as Strauss suggests.259 However, he must concede 
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that different moral outlooks can be compared in order to assess their truth or falsehood. 
In order to do so a reference to a standard is necessary. Both authors admit this. What 
they disagree on is the “status” of said standard. Strauss believes it must be one and 
absolute, while Berlin believes it needs only to be observed as an all-pervading yet 
conflicting pattern throughout the variety of human “expressions.”  
 
These constant patterns are to be found within the confines of what human nature 
permits. Accordingly, truth and falsehood presuppose no “end” of history, only an “end” 
of human nature – the human horizon. Within its limits, one finds a “finite” variety of 
values of which a “common minimum” is “sacred” because it holds true for all men – it 
is universal.  
 
The positions of Leo Strauss and Isaiah Berlin fundamentally diverge on two counts 
based on where they think the truth lies and what they think that truth is. One is a 
naturalist monist because he seeks a perfect harmonious truth outside man while the 
other is an empiricist pluralist for believing truth can only be found within man himself. 
When asked about their differences, Berlin replied that Strauss believed “in absolute 
good and evil, right and wrong, directly perceived by means of a kind of a priori vision, a 
metaphysical eye – a Platonic rational faculty which has not been granted to me,”260 
whereas Berlin thought “that all there is in the world is persons and things and ideas in 
people’s heads – goals, emotions, hopes, fears, choices, imaginative visions and all other 
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Now, it is possible to answer Strauss’s initial question: “can there be eternal principles on 
the basis of ‘empiricism?’”262 Yes, because the “experience of men up to now”263 reveals 
that all men know within them the same truths. Therefore, truth may be “self-evident,”264 
not because of an outside natural order revealed by a “metaphysical eye,” but because 
there is an inside conflicting moral order which all men experience. 
 
Yet, Strauss and Berlin converge on one axis: the central role of philosophy plays in the 
quest for the truth. Strauss holds the classical view of philosophy as the search for an 
eternal truth which lies outside of man, in a better and perfect world – a natural order. 
Berlin, on the other hand, believes “the truth” can only be found within and among men, 
through their experience, which is all they know. From this empiricist stand, Berlin 
derives the universal truth of pluralism – a truth that reveals reality is made of a 
combination of constant and variable elements. What is sacred, for Berlin, is what is 
necessarily experienced as valuable in any human life. Yes, experience can also blur, 
distort the interpretation of the “sacred principles,” which is why it is up to philosophy 
“to assist men to understand themselves and thus operate in the open, and not wildly in 
the dark.”265  
 
Both Strauss and Berlin agree the revelation of anything sacred depends on philosophy. 
The difference lies in the direction each looks to while exercising this “often agonizing 
and thankless but always important activity”266 – outside or inside of man. Strauss regards 
the inside of man as an imperfect and inconstant source, looking outside of him for a 
singular, perfect and eternal truth. Berlin, uses the philosophical lens to look inside the 
human experience seeking to clarify what is invariably true to all men. He finds at least 
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one sacred truth: all men know that they must choose between conflicting values. Pluralism is 


























3.3. THE VERDICT 
 
Isaiah Berlin presents a view of morality whereby there are many universal and equally 
valid ends to life that will at times clash within particular circumstances, thus imposing 
the burden of choice between them upon every human being. Instead of envisioning a 
world where the need to choose can be transcended by finding one universal solution to 
every conflict, Berlin rather affirms there are many possible answers to moral dilemmas. 
This acceptance of moral diversity elicits a semblance of relativism, a theory that grounds 
the validity of many moral orders in the many cultural or personal backgrounds from 
which they originate. Despite their similarities, pluralism and relativism remain different 
positions. For Berlin, those differences boiled down to two main arguments, the first of 
which shall now be recapitulated.  
 
Berlin claimed that pluralism allowed the possibility of objectively determining the truth 
and falsehood of moral solutions, which is to say that that judgment could be made by 
any human being regardless of where they stand in time or in space. For relativism, on 
the contrary, truth can merely be subjective, for it is measured against standards which 
belong to either a culture or an individual. Yet how can moral truth be discerned if there 
are limits to moral reasoning?; If there are many equally valid alternatives?; And if the 
very knowability of objective values and moral solutions to conflicts is context 
dependent?  
 
Once the two first questions are clarified the need for their answers subsides. First, the 
idea that moral reasoning is limited is derived out of the claim that some values are 
incommensurable. Even though Berlin’s use of this term is ambiguous, it was possible to 
assess that he meant this was an attribute of some conflicts among values, more likely to 
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be observed when such values are compared in the abstract than when circumstances are 
revealed more concrete. Indeed, if Berlin often pointed out that “we must not dramatize 
the incompatibility of values,”267 then a fortiori, one should definitely not overemphasize 
the incommensurability observed within some incompatibilities, as does John Gray.  
 
Most of the doctrine follows Joseph Raz by equating incommensurability with 
incomparability, ascribing to it the “inability of reason to guide our action.”268 The 
current intensity of the debate about this type of moral conflict is perhaps indicative, not 
of its ample importance, but of a void that hitherto existed in the philosophical debate 
altogether. Perhaps because of the “perennial fallacy,”269 moral philosophy has mostly 
been focused on the source of values270 rather than on the relationship between values. 
Once a pluralist view of ethics was tendered, attention was drawn to that relationship. 
Knowledge of the complexity of moral reasoning - a comparative process among 
abstractly equal and universal ends that may yield in concrete circumstances a positive 
relation between values, i.e. “better than,” “worse than” and “equal to,” or a negative one 
whereby the comparison fails in toto – appears to be at a very elementary stage. Perhaps 
due to this, the term “incommensurability” accounts for yet to be discovered positive, 
albeit complex, value relations.  
 
Still, even if incommensurability, or incomparability, is indeed a feature of some moral 
conflicts, its importance has been overplayed within the notion Berlin advanced of 
pluralism. The true problematic element of this theory lies in the fact that there are many 
equally valid values and equally valid solutions to conflicts. What is characteristic, or at 
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“the heart,”271 of pluralism is precisely the plurality of moral ends en lieu of a singular 
moral order. Reason is, of course, capable of identifying those ends. The fact that it is of 
no use when confronted with a choice among comparable equals or incomparables 
merely reinforces what is the central element in Berlin’s pluralism: the inevitability of 
choice. 
 
With this in mind, one can observe how the second question earlier mentioned can now 
be clarified. The quest for “the truth” usually conjures up the perennial fallacy that has 
long pervaded that pursuit, misguiding one towards the search for only one answer to a 
particular moral conflict. If pluralism claims the possibility of multiple moral truths, there 
is no inconsistency between the possibility of knowing truth and falsehood within a 
variety of valid solutions. A different question, of course, is “how” to tell the difference 
between moral truths and moral falsehoods. The answer is twofold: truth is determined 
in reference to objective standards; and it requires an ulterior element to be assessed – 
context. The former is part of Berlin’s second line of defence against relativism and shall 
soon be readdressed, while the latter shall now be recounted. 
 
The importance of context for the revelation of values is one of the main counts in 
which the kinship between pluralism and relativism is more prominent. Relativism places 
the standards of moral choice within what is directly experienced by each person, either 
as an individual (subjective relativism) or as part of a culture (cultural relativism). It 
presents a view of morality made up of moral islands, “windowless boxes” 272  or 
“impenetrable bubble(s),” 273  where people cannot correlate to others who have 
experienced life differently. But as Berlin points out “intercommunication between 
cultures in time and space is only possible because what makes men human is common to 
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them, and acts as a bridge between them.”274 Context, as the framework for experience, 
plays in pluralism an enabling role rather than a limiting one. There is, of course, a 
common context experienced by all those who bear the human condition, rendering all 
that is possibly valued and necessarily valued intelligible to every human being. In 
Berlin’s words, values are universal so long as they belong to the “human horizon,” 
which encloses within it a “minimum core” that all humanity craves in order to live a 
dignified existence.  
 
Besides this common context, there are levels of specificity to particular contexts which 
are indeed limited by time and space. Context, in this sense, carries a more direct 
revelatory function, for it shapes the way each human being becomes acquainted with 
what is universally valuable. Such is the influence context exerts on moral outlooks that, 
when ill perceived, it can lead to terrible moral “falsehoods,” as was the case with 
Nazism. This is the point where pluralism and relativism part ways. Moral judgment is 
not entirely relative to specific contexts. Because there is a wider human context in which 
specific contexts occur, it is always possible to transcend these latter contexts by 
reference to the former. More importantly, it is possible to objectively discern what is 
true or not despite being within or outside a particular context that generates a given 
moral solution.  
 
In sum, it appears Berlin’s claim that, unlike relativism, pluralism is consistent with the 
possibility of finding moral truths within the many possibilities of a plural moral universe 
holds against the alleged limits of moral reasoning and despite the importance specific 
contexts have in framing the intelligibility of values. What of Berlin’s other argument, 
however? 
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Berlin’s second line of defence against relativism lies in the claim that values are objective 
because they are universal. Having already demonstrated how this element is essential for 
the determination of the truth of moral claims, a problem of deeper proportions emerges 
for the theory with this claim: how can pluralism be consistent with universal values? 
This last question led the investigation back to the relativist views Gray and Strauss 
derive out of their understanding of what Berlin meant by the universality of values. The 
question was thus analysed from two opposite angles against the backdrop of these two 
critics’ interpretations: that of its implications according to Gray; and that of its 
foundations as denounced by Strauss. 
 
Gray argues that, even though values are universal, moralities are not. Therefore, 
liberalism is morally equivalent to any illiberal system. Among the many inconsistencies 
in this argument, the most important one is that it forgets that objective values serve as 
standards of truth. If, like Gray admits, negative liberty is part of the minimum core of 
values, then it is a necessary condition for a decent society. Therefore, by arguing that 
illiberal societies are just as valuable as liberal ones, he is claiming indecent societies are 
equally valuable as decent ones. Berlin can only consistently remain “a philosopher of 
human decency,”275 as Gray believes he is, by deriving at least one universal implication 
from pluralism: a moral minimum, of which a “measure of negative liberty”276 is part, 
must be manifest in any society that is considered decent. 
 
Finally Strauss argues that, like relativism, pluralism is self–refuting because its truth is 
derived out of “ordinary experience.” He questions how can any eternal principles be 
based upon a historicist view of reality, which is in turn unfinishable. Berlin’s thesis 
stands this final epistemological test, by grounding universal truth in what is universally 
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experienced by all men as such. The assessment of such universality requires no “end” to 
history, for it is enclosed within a “finite” human horizon instead. Hence, pluralism 
consistently asserts a reality of multiple valid moral outlooks which result from different 
combinations of universal elements. In other words, Berlin’s argument for pluralism as 
separate from relativism is successful: indeed, it is possible to assess the moral validity of 
diverse combinations of objective goods.  
 
The dissection of Isaiah Berlin’s arguments for the defence of pluralism against the 
allegations of relativism here analysed appears to reveal they stands their ground. The 
theories are indeed similar for legitimizing moral diversity and by sharing empiricist 
roots. But this happens differently for each. Relativism takes diversity and empiricism to 
their ultimate consequences. Not only does it obsolete morality’s purpose itself, for it 
frustrates the very possibility of objective moral judgment; it is also self-refuting, since it 
admits no universal claim about morality. Pluralism, as far as this analysis is concerned, 
manages to successfully reconcile diversity and universality, by describing a universally 
knowable moral realm that can validly manifest in a myriad of ways throughout the many 
concrete circumstances, which time and space may produce. Its values are many, equal 
and agonistic, but the moral realm that harbours them is one – human experience. 
Pluralism is a moral theory that is, perhaps thus far, the most congenial to humanity itself 











Isaiah Berlin considered political theory a branch of moral philosophy. He defined it as 
“an aspect of thought (and sometimes feeling) about men’s relationships to each other 
and to their institutions, in terms of purposes and scales of value which themselves alter 
as a result of historical circumstances of varying types . . .”277 The many answers it has 
generated to what is its central concern, “the question of obedience and coercion,”278 are 
tied to the all-pervading conviction in Berlin’s thought: choice is an “inescapable 
characteristic of the human condition.”279 This empirically known fact grounds pluralism 
as a moral philosophical position that branches out into political theory, which must 
cope with its implications. This chapter will expand on Berlin’s insight for the political 
demands of the present day. 
 
In one of Berlin’s most successful attempts to synthesize his very complex conception of 
Pluralism, he writes, 
 
There are many objective ends, ultimate values, some incompatible with others, pursued 
by different societies at various times, or by different groups in the same society, by 
entire classes or Churches or races, or by particular individuals within them, any of 
which may find itself subject to conflicting claims of uncombinable, yet equally ultimate 
and objective ends. Incompatible these ends may be; but their variety cannot be 
unlimited, for the nature of men, however various and subject to change, must possess 
some generic character if it is to be called human at all.280 
 
Pluralism thus emerges simultaneously as an alternative to the monist notion of one 
coherent moral whole and to the relativist conceptualization of many remote moralities. 
Each of these theories blindly privileges one of the two opposing purposes the balance 
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of which is the central concern of political theory: conformity and divergence. 
Ultimately, political theory is concerned with finding some basis for agreement capable 
of sustaining genuine “obedience,” and avoiding “coercion,” while preserving a 
legitimate variety of human life “expressions.”  
 
Monism sacrifices variety for agreement whereas relativism forfeits agreement in order to 
preserve variety. Pluralism yields to neither of those extremes. According to Berlin, the 
theory rather leads to the proposal of a via media between the two theories: a moral 
minimum must lie at the core of all societies that aim to be decent.281 Fully aware of how 
mild his suggestion is when compared with utopian aspirations,282 Berlin reckons: 
 
Of course social or political collisions will take place; the mere conflict of 
positive values alone makes this unavoidable. Yet they can, I believe, be 
minimized by promoting and preserving an uneasy equilibrium, which is 
constantly threatened and in constant need of repair—that alone, I repeat, is the 
precondition for decent societies and morally acceptable behavior.283 
 
This minimum, as Gray observes, “is universal in the sense that it is to be sought 
everywhere. That does not mean it will be everywhere the same.”284 This begs three 
questions: What constitutes this shifting minimum?; How is it to be defined?; And what 
of its implications for political theory?  
 
Berlin was characteristically vague about the content of the moral minimum. The few 
hints he made at it are consistent with what is regarded as human rights or H. L. A. 
Hart’s “minimum content of natural law.”285 As for how its content is to be revealed, is 
for Berlin a philosophical inquiry about man’s fundamental categories of thought:  
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These are characteristically philosophical questions, since they are questions about the all 
but permanent ways in which we think, decide, perceive, judge, and not about the data 
of experience – the items themselves. The test . . . is ultimately empirical: it is the degree 
of their success in forming a coherent and enduring conceptual system.286    
 
More importantly, how can political theory cope with many right answers to its “central 
question (of) obedience and coercion?”287 The fact of the matter is that, even if pluralism 
accurately unveils a world of many equally legitimate moral possibilities, concrete context 
allows for the choice of only one moral alternative.  
 
Does this mean that the inevitability of choice in political terms entails a sort of 
“practical monism,” whereby pluralism accurately describes the moral validity of many 
possible solutions, but only allows for one actual choice to be practiced? Or could this 
rather lead to a “practical relativism” that grounds the legitimacy of many abstract monist 
moral scripts in each different culture? Both would require an abstract prescription of 
which values should be prioritized in upcoming concrete situations. None are either 
necessary or possible to achieve.  
 
On one hand, as Berlin demonstrated, the most consummate attempts to homogenise 
mankind have, not only failed, but resulted in the most atrocious and contemptible 
episodes of its history. “If you are truly convinced that there is some solution to all 
human problems,” the author observed, “then you and your followers must believe that 
no price can be too high to pay in order to open the gates of such a paradise.”288 On the 
other hand, cultures are not “organic wholes” that are “hermetically sealed off from one 
another,” as John Gray pointed out. On the contrary, “they are different ways of settling 
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universal conflicts (that) make conflicting demands in the life of (single individuals.)”289 
This is, incidentally, why the author’s proposal of a modus vivendi among political systems, 
which embody conflicting moral outlooks, is not an appropriate response to the real 
challenge pluralism currently poses – a reality of constant cultural clash within a single 
political order.  
 
How, then, does the theory of pluralism correlate to the practice of pluralism for political 
purposes? Never has the answer to this question been more pertinent than it is now. 
Political systems are no longer associated with a singular culture in an attempt to adapt to 
the unprecedented cultural diversity they now harbor, especially in the West. Moreover, 
in today’s world, the physical barriers between societies are rapidly disappearing. Not 
only can people commute easily and constantly between countries, the communication 
revolution has enabled people to have an instant impact in faraway places.290 This 
constant and intense communication across diverse backgrounds is evermore demanding 
of a common basis for agreement.  
 
If political theory is, as Berlin stated, a branch of moral philosophy, moral neutrality is 
not an option, since “detachment is itself a moral position.”291 As Lord Raymond Plant 
points out, “a religion seeking a role in a liberal society can do so only if it is a liberalised 
form of that religion.”292 A Catholic cannot refuse to accept a gay couple in their 
business establishment or a Muslim may be required to dress differently than his faith 
requires, for example.293 Inevitably, any political solution will embody a moral stand on 
which values to privilege at the cost of others.  
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Political values can, at best, be defined in reference to “the central question of 
politics.”294 A separation between political morality and personal morality must be clearly 
stated. They should be established in reference to the aim, or “covering value,” of 
peaceful coexistence, leaving it up to each individual to “self-create” his own moral 
outlook. In other words, they should concern the limits between “the measure of 
negative liberty” 295  and of “obedience and coercion” 296  between citizens and their 
political power.  
 
On the other hand, accepting pluralism entails that the many valid political aims should be 
abstractly stated as guidelines for moral action in concrete situations, leaving which 
action to adopt up to the moral agent’s decision in said circumstances. Therefore, there is 
a horizon of universally recognized equal values. They will always compete, which is why 
none is supreme although some are essential. The concrete choices among them relate to 
the concrete context in which they may collide.  
 
This view is actually consistent with the legal systems found in most western states, for 
values are abstractly stated as constitutional principles which inform the abstract and 
general law – abstract because it is aimed at all situations of a particular kind; and general 
because it is directed at all people who may be found in such situations. The concrete and 
particular decisions are left to the administrative and judicial powers – concrete because 
they are applied to a contextualized case; and particular because they are directly devised in 
order to apply to a specific person.  
 
This realization only reinforces the accuracy of pluralism. On one hand “preserving an 
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uneasy equilibrium” 297  among moralities requires a sufficiently abstract system that 
acknowledges universal equally valid political goods, among which lies the respect for the 
many possible combinations of equally valid personal goods. On the other, actual moral 
choice is performed at the level of the concrete situation, thus enabling all necessary 
elements for a morally “true” outcome to be achieved.  
 
Isaiah Berlin was certain of one big thing: choice is inevitable. He appreciated the 
innumerous expressions human life could generate. “I don’t want the universe to be too 
tidy,”298 the “hedgefox” once remarked. Still, Berlin reckoned, “more people in more 
countries at more times accept more common values than is often believed.”299 Men can 
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